University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations

2018

The Role Of The Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex
In Value-Based Decision-Making
Linda Qinhe Yu
University of Pennsylvania, lindaqhyu@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Neuroscience and Neurobiology Commons, and the Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Yu, Linda Qinhe, "The Role Of The Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex In Value-Based Decision-Making" (2018). Publicly Accessible Penn
Dissertations. 3371.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3371

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3371
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Role Of The Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex In Value-Based
Decision-Making
Abstract

The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) has been shown to correlate with the subjective value for
options, across reward type and across hundreds of functional neuroimaging studies. Despite the prominence
of its role in preference-based decision-making, its specific contributions to how decisions are made have not
yet been well-characterised. Study 1 addresses what the vmPFC signal represents during decision-making.
While the vmPFC signal has been shown to correlate highly with subjective value in past studies, this signal is
also consistent with mental navigation through a conceptual attribute space using a grid-like code. We found
that the mental navigation model lacked support in the evidence, and the subjective value model remains the
best explanation for vmPFC signal during decision-making. After having established that the signal in vmPFC
reflects subjective value, Study 2 addresses whether subjective value representations remain consistent for
non-choice preference tasks, and when this representation comes online during the decision process. This
study shows that the value network seen previously for choice tasks also is active during a matching bidding
task, and that the vmPFC, interestingly, represents value only at the time of the final choice. Finally, in Study 3,
I address the question of how the vmPFC is necessary for subjective value in my third chapter. Transitivity
(the idea that if A > B, and B > C, then A > C) is a key property of a value-based system. Individuals with
ventromedial frontal lobe damage have been found to make more transitivity errors in the past, but it is not
known whether vmPFC damage causes fundamentally intransitive choices (implying abolishment of value),
or transitive but noisier choices (implying preservation of value but increased instability). We found strong
evidence for the second case, demonstrating that vmPFC damage adds instability to valuation but does not
abolish it. The evidence I present here is consistent with the theory that vmPFC is involved in a subjective
value-based process during decision-making, yet that value is a distributed process over many brain regions
where other regions may compensate for the loss of the vmPFC in calculating value.
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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF THE VENTROMEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX IN VALUEBASED DECISION-MAKING
Linda Q. Yu
Joseph W. Kable
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) has been shown to correlate with the
subjective value for options, across reward type and across hundreds of functional
neuroimaging studies. Despite the prominence of its role in preference-based decisionmaking, its specific contributions to how decisions are made have not yet been wellcharacterised. Study 1 addresses what the vmPFC signal represents during decisionmaking. While the vmPFC signal has been shown to correlate highly with subjective
value in past studies, this signal is also consistent with mental navigation through a
conceptual attribute space using a grid-like code. We found that the mental navigation
model lacked support in the evidence, and the subjective value model remains the best
explanation for vmPFC signal during decision-making. After having established that the
signal in vmPFC reflects subjective value, Study 2 addresses whether subjective value
representations remain consistent for non-choice preference tasks, and when this
representation comes online during the decision process. This study shows that the value
network seen previously for choice tasks also is active during a matching bidding task,
and that the vmPFC, interestingly, represents value only at the time of the final choice.
Finally, in Study 3, I address the question of how the vmPFC is necessary for subjective
value in my third chapter. Transitivity (the idea that if A > B, and B > C, then A > C) is a
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key property of a value-based system. Individuals with ventromedial frontal lobe damage
have been found to make more transitivity errors in the past, but it is not known whether
vmPFC damage causes fundamentally intransitive choices (implying abolishment of
value), or transitive but noisier choices (implying preservation of value but increased
instability). We found strong evidence for the second case, demonstrating that vmPFC
damage adds instability to valuation but does not abolish it. The evidence I present here
is consistent with the theory that vmPFC is involved in a subjective value-based process
during decision-making, yet that value is a distributed process over many brain regions
where other regions may compensate for the loss of the vmPFC in calculating value.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Our primate ancestors must be very jealous of us. We have a buffet of choices
before us in the supermarket, endless aisles of protein, fat and sugar available with the
single reach of the hand. The biggest problems we face (in rich, industrialized countries,
anyway) these days is which restaurant we want to tap on our phone so they can deliver
us dinner, and then what multi-million-dollar entertainment franchise to tap on next that
we can watch while we eat. We have so many choices that, in fact, we are often paralyzed
by them – a cacophony of multi-sensory influences competing for our hand. When you
can have anything you desire, what do you desire?
The central question of this dissertation is to figure out how our brain deals with
all this noise, and how we extract that precious thing called desire from them. This brain
of ours originates not just from those unlucky primate ancestors; from the earliest days as
a mere few cells strung together, it has had the task of keeping itself alive from when life
begun. To do so in the eons before smartphones, it had to figure out what actions to take
to feed itself and procreate. How does it do so in a way that would maximize its chances
of perpetuating itself? One way, economists thought, was that it should maximize utility,
which is essentially the usefulness of something in advancing one’s goals (Baron, 2008).
Utility is like a summary of the attributes (either benefits or drawbacks) of an item or
action, which can then be compared to those of another. Because utility is something that
is abstracted from the attributes of the individual options, dissimilar items like apples and
orange play-dough can be compared. Another important property of utility is that
1

preferences should be transitive (Samuelson, 1937). If a slime mold prefers agar patch A
to agar patch B, and a.p. B to a.p. C, then it ought to prefer A to C. The reason to do so is
to maximize utility towards towards its goal, which, for a slime mold, is to maximize
metabolic energy and avoid light (Devi, Guttes, & Guttes, 1968).
An alternative to using an integrated value representation to adjudicate among
options is using heuristics. For example, one could impose a rule that, when choosing
among two different agar patches, if the light exposure is similar enough, one should
choose the patch with more agar. Such a rule seems reasonable on its face, but would run
into problems of violating transitivity under certain conditions (Tversky, 1967) and
therefore would not maximize utility. Nevertheless, heuristics have been shown to be
used when people’s preferences are not well-formed, and/or if the decision-maker wishes
to avoid making trade-offs (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988).
A topic of study over the years has been if, and how, preferences are constructed.
A utility signal that is invariant to context and mode of elicitation should give rise to the
same preference for the same option no matter how the question is couched. This
concept, called procedure invariance, has been clearly shown not to be the case, and
people do change their preferences depending on how the question is asked, and even
slime molds change preferences based on what other options are available (for review on
humans see Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1992); for slime mold see Latty and Beekman
(2010)). However, it is debated as to how people construct their preferences – whether
such a signal is more utility-like, but just influenced by context at the time, or something
closer to heuristics, in which case it would be rule-based and not dependent on utility
(Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Mellers, Ordoñez, & Birnbaum, 1992).
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Behavioral economic concepts of value were intended as as-if models (meaning
people behave as if they are maximizing utility), and not as a way of describing how
things actually worked in their heads (Kable & Glimcher, 2009). Similarly, behavioral
studies are limited in their ability to assess the process by which people construct
preferences. For organisms more complex than our single-celled mold friend, we can use
neuroscience tools to investigate how this utility concept is actually implemented in the
brain, and reveal the timing of such representations during the decision process. In
humans, meta-analyses show a well-established network of regions known to be involved
in representing reward and preference, including the ventral striatum, posterior cingulate
cortex, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, or vmPFC (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013;
Levy & Glimcher, 2012; J. Peters & Büchel, 2010). The focus of this dissertation will be
on the vmPFC (an area of the frontal lobes around eye-level), and its involvement in
decision-making.
The Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex
The definition of the vmPFC can vary based on the paper or method of
investigation. In the fMRI literature, it generally refers to the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) below the genu of the corpus callosum [ventral portions of areas 24, 25, 32, --as
defined by Petrides and Pandya (1994)], the frontal pole (area 10), as well as medial
orbitofrontal cortex (area 14). In the lesion literature, it often additionally includes central
and lateral parts of the orbitofrontal cortex (areas 11, 13, and 12/47), and moreover the
white matter as well as the grey matter. In this thesis, we will refer to this broader
definition as “ventromedial frontal lobes”, in relation to discussions of studies of
individuals with lesions.
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The vmPFC and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) contain two distinct patterns of
connections, the medial network and the orbital network (Öngür & Price, 2000). The
medial network, which includes the aforementioned ACC areas and medial OFC, is
densely connected to limbic structures (e.g., amygdala, entorhinal cortex, hippocampus),
as well as projecting to the ventral striatum. The orbital network, on the other hand,
consists of the central and lateral OFC, and is characterised by connections to sensory
inputs, primarily olfactory, gustatory, visual, and somatosensory, in addition to being
connected to perirhinal cortex and more central parts of the striatum. The medial and
orbital networks share connections with each other, particularly through intermediary
areas like area 13 and posterior area 14.
The connections with limbic structures, then, puts the vmPFC at a particularly
suitable position to represent preferences, gaining inputs from structures involved in
emotion and memory, while projecting to reward-related centers like the nucleus
accumbens. At the same time, the multiple sensory inputs in orbitofrontal cortex, and its
connections to regions involved in recognition memory and action-learning, puts it in a
position to represent learning and linking sensory inputs to outcomes (Haber, 2016).
Activity within overlapping regions of the vmPFC has been found to correlate
with preferences for different categories of objects, suggesting that this region integrates
value information for different types of stimuli into a common scale (Bartra et al., 2013;
Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2012). The vmPFC’s
signal, moreover, describes a subjective assessment of the value of the options, which
integrates dimensions of costs and benefits into a single representation that reflect
individual differences (Hare, O'Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; Kable &
4

Glimcher, 2007; Plassmann, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2007; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack,
2007). More recently, it has been shown with multivariate methods that vmPFC
represents a domain-general value signal, while central orbitofrontal cortex instead
represents identity category-specific value (Howard, Gottfried, Tobler, & Kahnt, 2015;
Howard & Kahnt, 2017; Pegors, Kable, Chatterjee, & Epstein, 2015). Individuals with
damage to the vmPFC have been repeatedly found to be less consistent in preferencebased choices between multiple kinds of goods (Fellows and Farah, 2007; Camille et al.,
2011; Henri-Bhargava et al., 2012), suggesting a critical, general role for this region in
valuation of stimuli.
Open Questions
Though the above evidence might show that value is robustly associated with the
vmPFC, the opposite inference cannot be made. The vmPFC is involved in many other
domains of cognition, a prominent one of which is schematic memory. fMRI studies have
shown that vmPFC activity represents implicit relationships between elements within a
task (Schuck, Cai, Wilson, & Niv, 2016; Zeithamova, Dominick, & Preston, 2012), and
damage to the vmPFC has been shown to disrupt and weaken processing of semantic
associations (Spalding, Jones, Duff, Tranel, & Warren, 2015; Spalding et al., 2018). One
way of representing and inferring relationships between concepts is by situating them
within a mental map, like one would buildings in a city – a theory known as the cognitive
map (Tolman, 1948). Recently, fMRI studies have found that vmPFC appears to be
involved in navigation through physical and conceptual space (Constantinescu, O’Reilly,
& Behrens, 2016; Doeller, Barry, & Burgess, 2010), using the same mechanism of gridlike coding as the entorhinal cortex for spatial navigation (Hafting, Fyhn, Molden, Moser,
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& Moser, 2005).This grid-like code has been proposed to underlie cognition broadly,
including decision-making (Bellmund, Gärdenfors, Moser, & Doeller, 2018). In other
words, making decisions between two movies would be like mentally traversing in a
space made out of its attributes, e.g., genre and critical rating. Thus, though subjective
value has been found to correlate with activity in the vmPFC, conceptual navigation
represents a model of choice that could conceivably mimic such a signal that would not
be value-based at all. The plausibility of such a model in decision-making has not yet
been tested, and remains an open question.
Secondly, while there is an extensive literature on the vmPFC’s role in
preferences for choice tasks, it is not well-established as to how this process is conducted
in the brain in preference tasks other than choice. That the same neural network would be
active for a non-choice preference task is not to be taken for granted, given that people
may change their preferences between choice and matching tasks (where one must come
up with an amount for an attribute that would make one option equivalent to another),
and it is thought that different strategies underlie choice in these different paradigms
(Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Tversky et al., 1988). In addition, there is little known about
the temporal evolution of preferences in human vmPFC, and once again the available
evidence is only on choice tasks (Harris, Adolphs, Camerer, & Rangel, 2011; Harris,
Clithero, & Hutcherson, 2018). Thus, it is an open question as to how preferences are
represented in non-choice preference tasks, and when this information arises during the
decision process.
Finally, though individuals with vmPFC damage has been shown in the past to
make more transitivity errors (Camille, Griffiths, Vo, Fellows, & Kable, 2011; Fellows &
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Farah, 2007; Henri-Bhargava, Simioni, & Fellows, 2012), it is unknown if vmPFC
damage causes fundamentally intransitive choices, or transitive but noisier choices. This
distinction is important because the first possibility would imply that the vmPFC is
necessary for value-based decisions per se (in which case decisions would be made
without value, for example relying on heuristics), while the second would imply that the
vmPFC is necessary for an aspect of value-based choice. This question has implications
for whether the idea of value is a distributed system where each region of the frontal
lobes computes attributes in a similar fashion, but contributes distinct aspects of value to
the whole representation (Hunt & Hayden, 2017), or if the vmPFC represents the final
common pathway for value representation.
My dissertation aims to describe vmPFC function during decision-making. It will
address three questions: 1) does the vmPFC signal during decision-making truly reflect
subjective value, or is it instead reflective of the conceptual navigation model? 2) how are
preferences represented in the brain in a non-choice task, and when does it do so during
the decision-process? 3) in what way is the VMF necessary to value-based choice?

General Methods
In this dissertation, I will use two cognitive neuroscience methods: analysis of
neural data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and the study of the
behavior of individuals who have sustained focal damage to specific brain areas. fMRI is
an observational method in which participants perform cognitive tasks while lying in a
scanner that measures the oxygenation level in blood flow (blood-oxygen-level
7

dependent, or BOLD, signal) throughout the brain. If the task elicits more activity in a
certain brain region, then that region will consume more oxygen, therefore prompting
more oxygenated blood flow there and increasing the BOLD signal. The evidence this
method provides is correlational, meaning that the BOLD signal is correlated with neural
activity — and hence an fMRI study tests the association of this activity with some task
variable, or behavior. The advantage of this method is that it provides a relatively high
resolution, whole-brain picture of activity. As such, it is possible to test various cognitive
models and statistically assess how well they describe actual brain function. However,
fMRI evidence does not tell us whether any brain region is necessary for the function in
question.
My second method, study of individuals with focal lesions, provides evidence for
necessity. A lesion study involves comparing the behavior of a group of individuals with
damage to a target region (here vmPFC) against two control groups: an age and education
matched healthy control group, and a group of individuals with damage to other parts of
the brain (in this case, the frontal lobes) sparing the target region. The second control
group is intended to rule out both that any observed behavioral differences are an effect
of sustaining frontal lobe damage or having undergone a major medical event. If the
vmPFC-damaged group performs worse than both control groups on a certain measure, it
is taken as evidence that the vmPFC is specifically necessary for normal performance on
that measure. This technique is inferentially powerful, but spatially imprecise (as there is
no control over the extent or location of brain damage each individual sustains).
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By combining the advantages of both methods in my dissertation, I will both be
able to investigate models of representation and process in decision-making, as well as
able to assess the necessity of the vmPFC to decision-making.
Research Overview
Chapter 2 addresses what the vmPFC signal represents during decision-making.
While the vmPFC signal has been shown to correlate highly with subjective value in past
studies, neural models inspired by spatial navigation have recently suggested that the
vmPFC may be involved in navigation through conceptual space (Constantinescu et al.,
2016). This has led to proposals that decision-making and other cognitive processes
operate via mental navigation through a conceptual space made out of attributes (Behrens
et al., 2018; Bellmund et al., 2018). Thus, in this chapter we assess both the theoretical
plausibility and empirical fitness of this conceptual navigation model to vmPFC activity
during decision-making. We find that the conceptual navigation model and subjective
value model are highly correlated, so it is theoretically possible that the signal previously
interpreted as subjective value could actually instead be reflective of mental navigation
through conceptual space consisting of option attributes. We then sought to distinguish
these two possibilities in a large dataset of 106 participants that performed an delay
discounting task while going under functional neuroimaging. We found that the mental
navigation model lacked support in the evidence, and the subjective value model remains
the best explanation for vmPFC signal during decision-making.
After having established that the signal in vmPFC reflects subjective value,
Chapter 3 addresses both how value is represented in a non-choice-based preference
9

paradigm, and when does this representation comes online during the decision process.
We analysed the data of 37 participants who performed a bidding delay discounting task,
where they were asked to decide the amount of money they would accept to receive
immediately, in exchange for $75 offered at varying delays. Participants entered their bid
by scrolling through descending possible amounts of money and submitting their final
decision. We found that first, that the brain does represent a similar pattern of valuerelated activity as found in choice tasks, and second, that the vmPFC represented the final
bid only at the very end of the decision period, when the participants submitted their
answers, and not any time prior. These results both support the idea of preference
construction late into the decision, and demonstrates that neural representation between
choice tasks and other types of preference-based tasks share common characteristics.
Finally, though evidence from both fMRI and past lesion studies show that
vmPFC is critically involved in valuation, it is not known how it is necessary for
subjective value. Specifically, is value abolished altogether in vmPFC damage, or does it
remain but is altered in some way? I address this question in Chapter 4, by leveraging the
idea that transitivity is a fundamental feature of value. Past studies have only presented
choices between options once, so that violations of transitivity are considered in a
deterministic way, which does not make clear whether the subject would always make
such an error if given the same options again. To look at the question of whether VMF
subjects are fundamentally transitive, it is necessary to present subjects with repeated
pairs of choices, and look at whether they are consistent with transitivity in a probabilistic
way, over the repetitions. We presented individuals with VMF damage, individuals with
frontal damage sparing the VMF, and healthy controls with complete sets of pairwise
10

choices in three categories (art, chocolate brand, and gambles), where some of the pairs
are repeated (to test probabilistic transitivity) and others were not (to test deterministic
transitivity). We found strong evidence for the second possibility, where individuals with
VMF damage were fundamentally transitive in tests of probabilistic transitivity, but still
made more errors relative to control groups in deterministic definitions of transitivity.
This finding is consistent with the theory that value is a distributed process over many
brain regions, where other regions can compensate for the loss of VMF in calculating
value. However, the VMF is necessary for stability in choices.
In conclusion, my three chapters advance the state of knowledge of the vmPFC’s
role in decision-making, by showing that 1) its signals are consistent with subjective
value over an alternative model, 2) that value representations in vmPFC come online at
the end of a decision process and not prior, and 3) that it is necessary for the stability and
fidelity of decisions. The evidence I present here is consistent with the idea that vmPFC
is involved in a value-based process during decision-making, yet that it cannot be the
critical region solely responsible for value-based choice.

11

Chapter 2 -- Subjective value, not a grid-like code, describes
neural activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex during
decision-making

Abstract
Recently, activity in the ventromedial frontal and entorhinal cortices has been
shown to be modulated in a grid-like manner for navigation through conceptual as well as
physical space. These findings have led to proposals that such a grid-like code could
broadly underlie complex cognition, and specifically may be used for comparisons
between multi-attribute objects in decision-making. We first assess the plausibility of this
claim, showing theoretically that the activity correlated with subjective value observed in
vmPFC in previous fMRI studies of decision-making could, in principle, reflect
navigation through a conceptual space defined by the option attributes. We then
empirically test for grid-like modulation in a large fMRI dataset of individuals making
intertemporal choices. Here, though, we find that grid-like model fails confirmatory tests
and does not provide the best description of the neural activity during decision-making.
Our results constrain the type of tasks for which grid-like modulation is observed in
vmPFC and further confirm that subjective value remains a good description of neural
activity in vmPFC during decision-making.

12

Introduction

Neural activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) has been shown to
correlate with the subjective value of expected or experienced outcomes across a wide
variety of decision-making tasks and categories of outcomes (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero
& Rangel, 2013; Levy & Glimcher, 2012). Neural correlates of subjective value have
been found in vmPFC using both functional neuroimaging in humans as well as single
cell recording in non-human animals (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Strait, Blanchard, &
Hayden, 2014; Yamada, Louie, Tymula, & Glimcher, 2018). One potential explanation
for these correlates is that vmPFC encodes a representation of expected subjective value
that could be used to make decisions or to guide learning (Kable & Glimcher, 2009).
However, recent studies have suggested that the similar area of vmPFC observed
in human neuroimaging studies of decision-making encodes representations important for
navigation through real and conceptual spaces (Constantinescu et al., 2016; Doeller et al.,
2010; Jacobs et al., 2013). Both intracortical recordings and fMRI studies have revealed
activity in medial prefrontal cortex while humans navigated virtual arenas that reflected a
hexagonal spatial pattern characteristic of grid cells (Doeller et al., 2010; Jacobs et al.,
2013). Grid cells were first discovered in entorhinal cortex during spatial navigation and
can provide an efficient representation of two-dimensional space (Hafting et al., 2005).
Furthermore, the same potential fMRI signature of grid cells has been observed in
vmPFC during navigation in a purely conceptual space (Constantinescu et al., 2016).
Specifically, stimuli in that study could be characterized by two dimensions, and when
subjects imagined traversing the stimulus space defined by those two dimensions, activity
13

in vmPFC showed a similar response pattern as that observed during two-dimensional
spatial navigation.
These results raise the intriguing question of whether the patterns of activity
observed in vmPFC during conceptual navigation might explain the engagement of this
region during decision-making tasks. Many decisions involve a choice between two
options that differ along multiple dimensions or attributes. For example, choices can be
between foods that differ in their taste and health or between monetary options that differ
in their amount and probability or amount and delay. In the same way that spatial
navigation involves moving through the two dimensions of longitude and latitude, and
the conceptual navigation studied in Constantinescu et al. (2016) involves moving
through a space defined by two stimulus attributes, might decisions involve navigating a
conceptual space defined by the attribute dimensions of the choice options?
Here we aim to assess whether grid cell-like activity reflecting conceptual
navigation through attribute space can account for the value correlates previously
observed in vmPFC during decision making. If true, this would demonstrate that these
signals do not reflect any encoding of value, and instead can be subsumed under an
account of vmPFC function in terms of grid cell-like activity and more broadly in terms
of encoding a cognitive map of decision space. We first show theoretically that grid celllike activity could in principle explain subjective value correlates, as a plausible
construction of grid-like regressors for a two-attribute choice task is highly correlated
with subjective value. We then empirically test which of these two models better explains
BOLD activity in vmPFC, using a large pre-existing dataset of subjects performing a
standard intertemporal choice task (Kable et al., 2017). Our results unambiguously show
14

that vmPFC activity in this task is correlated with subjective value and cannot be
explained by grid cell-like modulation.

Methods
Task.
We used the intertemporal task from Kable et al. (2017) as the decision-making
task in the following analyses. Participant chose between a smaller immediate reward and
a larger later reward. The smaller immediate reward was held constant at $20 today while
the larger later reward varied in amount (A: $21 ~ $85) and delay (D: 20 days ~ 180 days)
from trial to trial. Each trial displayed the amount and delay of the delayed option; the
immediate option as not displayed. Participants had 4 seconds to make their choice.
Theoretical correlation between subjective value and grid regressors.
Firstly, we sought to show that, in theory, hexagonal grid modulation could mimic
or account for activity correlated with subjective value (SV) during decision making. To
do this, we calculated the SV signal at a given discount rate for a given range of amounts
and delays, and then estimated the best-fitting hexagonal grid modulation for this signal.
The correlation between the SV signal and its best-fitting hexagonal grid modulation was
taken as a measure of the highest potential similarity between the two signals. This
correlation was examined across a range of discount rates.
For a given discount rate, the SVs of delayed monetary outcomes were calculated
using the hyperbolic model:
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where k is the discount rate. The amount A varied from 20 to 80 in increments of 5 (13
levels) and the delay D varied from 20 to 180 in increments of 5 (33 levels) resulting in a
total of 429 SVs for a given k. This 429-element vector of SV was then regressed against
two hexagonal grid modulation regressors in order to estimate the best-fitting hexagonal
modulation signal:

In words, the grid-like model contains a linear combination of sine and cosine of
the direction of the trajectory angle

with 60° periodicity. The trajectory angle

is taken

as the angle between the immediate option ($20 now) and the delayed option on each
trial. This model implicitly assumes that the direction of “navigation” is a straight line
between the immediate and the delayed option.
The Pearson correlation between SV and the fitted signal (i.e.,
) was assessed as the similarity statistic between the two signals.
This procedure was repeated for 51 levels of k whose base-10 log ranged from -5 (i.e., k =
0.00001) to 0 (i.e., k = 1) in 0.1 increments.

Dataset.
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In order to empirically test whether hexagonal grid modulation can better explain
activity patterns previously attributed to SV during decision making, we used the
intertemporal choice fMRI dataset from Kable et al. (2017). 107 participants (between the
ages of 18-35) completed two sessions of scans 10 weeks apart. Each scan session
contained 120 binary choices. 5 participants whose choices were entirely one-sided in a
session (i.e., always choosing the immediate option or always choosing the delayed
option) were removed from further analyses, making the total count of subjects 102.
Participants were scanned with a Siemens 3T Trio scanner with a 32-channel head
coil. T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired using an MPRAGE sequence (T1 =
1100ms; 160 axial slices, 0.9375 x 0.9375 x 1.000 mm; 192 x 256 matrix). T2*-weighted
functional images were acquired using an EPI sequence with 3mm isotropic voxels, (64 x
64 matrix, TR = 3,000ms, TE = 25ms; tilt angle = 30°) involving 53 axial slices with 104
volumes. B0 fieldmap images were also collected for distortion correction (TR = 1270ms,
TE = 5 and 7.46ms). The datasets were preprocessed via FSL FEAT (FMRIB fMRI
Expert Analysis Tool). Functional images were skull stripped with BET (FMRIB Brain
Extraction Tool), motion corrected and aligned with MCFLIRT (FMRIB Linear Image
Restoration Tool with Motion Correction), spatially smoothed with a FWHM 9mm
Gaussian Kernel, and high pass filtered (104sec cutoff). Registration was performed with
FNIRT with warp resolution of 20mm (FMRIB’s Non-linear Image Registration Tool) to
a 2mm MNI standard brain template.
Data analysis.
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Empirical demonstration of hexagonal grid modulation involves two steps
(Constantinescu et al., 2016). The first step is to identify regions in the brain where
variance in activity is significantly explained by two grid-angle regressors (i.e.,
). The second step is to show that a given person’s unique grid angle,
calculated from these two hexagonal regressors, is consistent across time, and that such
consistency is only observed for 6-fold modulation and not for other numbers of folds
(e.g., 4, 5, 7, 8).
For the first step, we ran a whole-brain GLM using FSL FEAT on the first
session’s data. Three regressors of interest were used: the event regressor that modeled
average activity of all trials, and the two hexagonal grid angle regressors
(

). All three regressors were time-locked to the

beginning of the trial with 0.1 duration. Standard 6-parameter motion regressors were
also included as nuisance variables. We calculated the f-stat for the two hexagonal
regressors and converted it to a z-stat1. We performed group-level permutation testing
using the 102 subjects’ z-transformed f-stat map with threshold-free cluster enhancement
to identify brain regions that are well explained by the two grid angle regressors.
For the second step, we identified ROIs in which we calculated each individual’s
grid angle and evaluated angle consistency across sessions. We created two spherical
ROIs of 33 voxels (2mm voxels) from the peak activation coordinates reported by
1

The conversion to a z-stat provided three benefits: 1) z-stats are more easily
interpretable as they are from a standard normal distribution, 2) z-stats do not depend on
degrees of freedom to calculate probabilities, and, most importantly, 3) the null
distribution of z-stats is centered around 0 which allows for simple permutation testing by
sign-flipping.
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Constantinescu et al. (2016) in mPFC and ERC. To address any concerns that the loci of
grid activation are different in our dataset from those of Constantinescu et al. (2016), we
also defined two spherical ROIs of 33 voxels based on our peak activation coordinates
from the GLM above, choosing the peaks in mPFC and ERC that were closest to the
coordinates in Constantinescu et al. (2016). Finally, we also adopted the mPFC and
ventral striatum (VS) ROI from Bartra et al. (2013), which identified consistent SV
effects across hundreds of studies through meta-analysis.
In order to test for the consistency of hexagonal grid angles, we first needed to
calculate the individual’s unique grid angle. For a n-fold modulation, the individual’s grid
angle was calculated by first running a GLM on the first session’s data with

and

as the modulators. Then we calculated the average coefficients for the cosine and
sine regressors within the ROI (

). The n-fold grid angle was then

calculated:

Subsequently, the consistency of the grid angle was tested on the second session by
calculating the ROI’s z-stat (converted from t-stat) for the following GLM regressor:

If there is significant hexagonal modulation in an ROI, the average coefficient for this
regressor when

should be significantly positive, but not so when
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Results
Theoretical correlation between subjective value and grid regressors
We first show via simulation that hexagonal grid modulation, of the form
previously reported in medial prefrontal cortex, could account in theory for previously
reported activity correlated with SV in this region. Using an intertemporal choice task as
an example, we calculated the best-fitting hexagonal modulation for different theoretical
SV signals that assumed different discount rates. Figure 1 shows the correlation between
an SV signal and its most similar hexagonal modulation signal at various discount rates.
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Figure 2-1. Correlation between subjective value signal and its most similar
hexagonal modulation signal. The top three panels show simulated SV signal for
various delayed amounts at various discount rates and the bottom three panels show the
best fitting hexagonal grid modulations. The correlation between the two signals are
provided below at various discount rates.
The correlation between the two signals ranges between r = 0.5 and r = 0.7 depending on
the discount rate. These correlations show that it is possible for hexagonal grid
modulation and a SV signal to be confused with each other, and therefore hexagonal grid
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modulation provides a possible alternative theoretical account of previously reported
activity correlated with SV.
Data.
We then examined whether hexagonal grid modulation does account for SVrelated activity in actual data, using an intertemporal choice fMRI dataset from Kable et
al. (2017). As previously reported, widespread regions show activity correlated with SV,
calculated for each subject individually using their discount rate. These activations are
consistent across two scanning sessions separated by 10 weeks (Figure 2).

Figure 2-2. Regions with significant SV correlation in session 1 and session 2. Top
panel shows the t-statistics (estimated from permutation) of regions that show significant
correlation with SV signal (p < 0.05 with permutation testing). Bottom panel shows the tstatistics (estimated from permutation) of regions that show significant correlation with
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SV signal (p < 0.05 with permutation testing). Bottom right brains show overlays of the
two ROIs from Bartra et al. (2013).

Though hexagonal grid modulation could in theory account for this SV-correlated
activity, we do not find that it does so in this dataset. Testing the hexagonal grid
modulation hypothesis requires two steps: (1) showing that activity in a region is
significantly explained by hexagonal grid regressors, and (2) showing that the grid angle
implied by those regressors is consistent across time. There are many brain regions in this
dataset where activity was significantly explained by the combination of two grid angle
regressors (

). In fact, almost the entire brain reaches statistical

significance for the F-test of these two regressors (Fig. 2). The peaks in this map include
mPFC and ERC, as well as several other regions including somatosensory cortex, right
TPJ, and dmPFC.

Figure 2-3. Z-transformed F-statistics of brain regions that are significantly
explained by two hexagonal grid modulation regressors. Most brain regions were
significant at p < 0.05 level. The right panel shows overlays of grid-cell ROIs: two
spherical ROIs defined from peak coordinates of Constantinescu et al. (2016) and two
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spherical ROIs defined from peak F-statistic activation that was closest to the coordinates
of Constantinescu et al. (2016).

However, though the two grid angle regressors account for significant variance in
activity in widespread regions including MPFC and ERC, the grid angle implied by these
regressors is not consistent across time as required by grid cell hypothesis. We evaluated
grid angle consistency in 4 ROIs in MPFC or ERC. These ROIs were defined based on
the peaks in the above analyses (Figure 3) or previous reports of grid cell like activity
(Constantinescu et al., 2016). We calculated the average grid angle in the first session’s
data in a given ROI, and then tested whether the activity in the second session was well
aligned with the first session’s grid angle. The grid angle consistency effect for hexagonal
modulation was not significant in any ROI, nor was this effect larger in size for the 6-fold
regressor than that observed for modulation at other folds (4 fold, 5-fold, 7-fold and 8fold). (Figure 4). Note that the pattern observed in MPFC, of decreasing grid angle
consistency from 4-8 fold modulation, is predicted of a signal that is correlated with SV
(Supplementary figure 2).
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Figure 2-4. Effect of grid-angle consistency and SV in grid cell ROIs. The top two
panels show consistency effects and SV effects in ROIs defined by a previous study by
Constantinescu et al. (2016), the middle two show consistency effects and SV effects in
ROIs defined by the closest F-statistic peaks to coordinates of Constantinescu et al.
(2016). The left panels show ROIs in mPFC and the right two panels show ROIs in ERC.
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (uncorrected t-test against zero).
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We also checked for grid angle consistency in regions previously associated with
SV via meta analysis by Bartra et al. (2013). In both mPFC and VS, there is no evidence
of hexagonal grid consistency and rather a similar pattern as in other mPFC ROIs:
decreasing grid angle consistency from 4-8 fold manipulation (Fig. 5).

Figure 2-5. Effect of grid-angle consistency and SV in SV-defined ROIs. The left
panel shows consistency effects and SV effects in mPFC ROI from Bartra et al. (2013)
and the right panel shows them in VS ROI from Bartra et al. (2013). * p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01, *** p < 0.001 (uncorrected t-test against zero).

Discussion
In this paper, we assessed the idea that vmPFC activity during decision-making,
commonly interpreted as subjective value, could be explained by a grid-like signal
reflecting conceptual navigation through option attribute space. We showed that this idea
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is theoretically plausible, in that regressors from a subjective value model are highly
correlated with those of a grid-like navigational model, implying that past findings of
subjective value-related activity could in principle be consistent with the conceptual
navigational explanation. Thus, it was necessary to empirically test whether the
conceptual navigation model can, in fact, appropriately describe activity during decisionmaking. We assessed the fit of this model, replicating the methods of Constantinescu et
al. (2016), to the fMRI data of a large dataset of subjects performing a standard twoattribute decision task (intertemporal choice) across two sessions. In the critical analysis,
we assessed the consistency of subject-specific navigational angle within a region of
interest between two days of data collection, as well as whether 6-fold modulation (a
characteristic of grid cell activity) can describe activity better than modulations at other
frequencies. We found neither to be the case: the subject-specific navigational angle was
not consistent between two days of data collection, and 6-fold modulation did not
outperform control models with modulations at other frequencies. Thus, there is no
evidence that the grid-like conceptual navigational model explains vmPFC activity during
decision-making, and subjective value remains the best description of this activity.
Our results constrain the implications of Constantinescu et al. (2016), by limiting
the conditions under which grid-like activity is observed in the vmPFC. Our standard
intertemporal choice task is obviously very different from the sort of mental navigation
demanded in Constantinescu et al. (2016). Their study involved extensive learning of a
novel conceptual space by the participants prior to the navigational task; ours takes
advantage of a spontaneous one created by the option attributes as they are presented.
Their navigational task involved a period of mental simulation where the participants are
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asked to “imagine” the progress of the stimulus, similar to spatial navigation tasks,
whereas we simply ask participants to make a choice. Nevertheless, the two tasks share
important similarities in the sense that both operate within a two-dimensional space
where grid-like representation of the task structure might be expected (Behrens et al.,
2018). Our finding means that the task space required when making decisions between
options is one scenario that does not provoke grid-like representations, and thus grid-like
coding cannot explain all cognitive activity in the vmPFC during such tasks.
One potential objection to our results might be that we do not see grid-like
representations because we are not considering either the appropriate two-dimensional
mental space or method of mental travel. One assumption made in our analyses was
linear spacing between each unit in amount and delay. As we know that human beings do
not generally perceive numbers in a linear way, but rather loglinearly as numbers become
larger (Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009), perhaps loglinear spacing would be
more appropriate. Indeed, in loglinear space, the grid-like model correlates even more
highly with the subjective value model (see Supplementary materials). However, when
tested empirically, the grid-like model with loglinear spacing also fails to account for
BOLD activity. Another assumption we made in our grid-like model was that the subjects
would “navigate” in a straight line between the immediate and delayed options. There are
other conceivable assumptions such an analysis could make; however, we chose these
assumptions precisely because they resulted in high correlations between the subjective
value and grid-like regressors, meaning that the latter could plausibly mimic past results
seen with the former. Thus, we have shown that the most plausible forms of grid-like
model did not describe decision-making activity in the brain. Finally, an inherent
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limitation of the intertemporal choice paradigm is that choices with tradeoffs necessarily
preclude “no-brainer” pairs (i.e., strictly dominated options), and therefore many of the
possible angles of conceptual travel in the attribute space. However, we could have
sufficiently detected evidence of sixfold modulation in the quadrant of angles we were
able to test.
The vmPFC is important for a wide variety of functions, from learning and
decision-making to schematic memory and social cognition. A possible explanation for
its diverse function is that different subregions of the vmPFC serve different functions.
Though we used the same ROI as in Constantinescu et al. (2016) for our analysis, fMRI
does not allow for the resolution necessary to differentiate between populations of
neurons that may have different functions. Another possibility that has been raised is that
the vmPFC represents a cognitive map of the inferred, hidden structure of the current task
(Behrens et al., 2018; Wilson, Takahashi, Schoenbaum, & Niv, 2014). We have presented
here evidence against the cognitive map based on a grid-like code during decisionmaking. However, the nature of the coding scheme in vmPFC may instead depend on the
demands of the task at hand. Subjective value is a representation that has long been
known to afford useful features for decision-making; for example, using such a
representation of multi-attribute options and choosing the maximal valued option is
guaranteed to result in transitive, non-cyclical choices (Samuelson, 1937). Subjective
value may therefore be the most efficient representation of the option space for the kind
of decision tasks we studied here.
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Supplemental Materials
Methods.
Theoretical correlation between subjective value and grid regressors in
logarithmic space.
In addition to grid angle analyses in the manuscript, we also considered the
possibility that the cognitive map may be represented in logarithmic scale such that the
hexagonal grid angle only manifests when one scales both axes of the space
logarithmically. Hence, we re-did all the analyses in the manuscript with logarithmic grid
angle calculations. All methods are as described in the manuscript except for the
calculation of angles which is now

instead of

.
We first assessed the theoretical correlation between SV signal and hexagonal
grid modulation signal in logarithmic space. This was done by calculating a range of SVs
for a given discount rate and then fitting the best hexagonal modulation signal (methods
in main manuscript). The Pearson correlation between the SV and the fitted signal was
assessed as the similarity between the two signals.
Simulation of angle consistency in grid space assuming subjective value signal
We were interested in finding out how the grid-like regressor would behave in
within-subject, inter-session angle consistency analyses if the true underlying signal
actually represented subjective value. This simulation would be useful to compare against
our analyses in real data, to better assess how subjective value describes the pattern of
results. Thus, an additional simulation was performed to predict the pattern of grid angle
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consistency analyses if we assume the true signal actually represented SV, in both regular
and logarithmic space. First, we calculated the SVs of 102 people in our dataset for both
session 1 and session 2. A Gaussian noise with

was added on to the SV to

simulate fMRI noise in signal. Then, we estimated each individual’s grid angle based on
the first session’s simulated SV signal by running the following regression:

Based on the grid angle calculated from session 1

, we used the following regression

to assess the consistency effect:

The resulting t-statistic of

was converted to a z-statistic and then compared across

different number of folds (n = 4 ~ 8).
Analysis of data
We proceeded largely in the same manner as the main manuscript. The only
difference being the calculation of grid angles (described above).
Results.
Theoretical correlation between subjective value and grid regressors in
logarithmic space.
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Firstly, our simulations show that it is quite possible for logarithmic hexagonal
grid activity to mimic SV signal, even more so than non-logarithmic hexagonal grid
activity. Across different discount rates, we found that the correlation between
logarithmic grid angle activity and SV activity was very high (r = 0.8~1.0) and always
higher than the correlation between non-logarithmic grid angle activity and SV (Suppl.
Figure 1).
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Supplementary figure 1. Correlation between SV signal and its most similar
hexagonal modulation signal in regular and logarithmic space. The top three panels
show simulated SV signal for various delayed amounts at various discount rates and the
middle three panels show the best fitting hexagonal grid modulations in regular space.
The bottom three panels show the best fitting hexagonal grid modulations in logarithmic
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space. The correlation between the two signals are provided below at various discount
rates.
Simulation of angle consistency in grid space assuming true subjective value
signal.
Our simulations of fMRI data that posit a true underlying SV signal shows that, in
this scenario, the grid regressors in regular, non-logarithmic space would show a pattern
of decreasing inter-session angle consistency as the folds of modulation of the angles
grow. The consistency is highest for the four-fold regressor, which is the regressor that
most closely resembles the pattern of subjective value (i.e., highest for low delays and
high amounts, then decreases as the delays grow). The six-fold regressor, in this case,
would not be the model with the highest angle consistency. In logarithmic space, the
inter-session angle consistency would be flat across modulations of folds, and the six-fold
regressor would once again not be the model with the highest consistency (Suppl. Figure
2).
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Supplementary figure 2. Angle consistency in simulated fMRI data positing
subjective value in non-logarithmic and logarithmic space. The left panel shows
results of the inter-session angle consistency analysis for simulated fMRI data that
assume underlying subjective value in non-logarithmic space, for the 6-fold grid
regressor and the control folds. The right panel shows the same in logarithmic space. In
both cases, the 6-fold regressor does not outperform the other folds for high angle
consistency.

Analysis of data.
Just like non-logarithmic grid angle regressors, the logarithmic grid angle
regressors (

and

) together were able to significantly explain variance in

most of the brain regions (Suppl. Figure 3).
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Supplementary figure 3. Z-transformed F-statistics of Brain regions that are
significantly explained by two logarithmic hexagonal grid modulation regressors.
Most brain regions were significant at p < 0.05 level. The right panel shows overlays of
grid-cell ROIs: two spherical ROIs defined from peak coordinates of Constantinescu et
al. (2016) and two spherical ROIs defined from peak F-statistic activation that was
closest to the coordinates of Constantinescu et al. (2016).

We then repeated our analyses for inter-session, within-subject angle consistency
analyses for each ROI, but this time in logarithmic space (MPFC and ERC ROIs defined
from peak activation in Constantinescu et al., 2016 and from peak activation in our own
GLM analysis above; the MPFC and VS ROIs from Bartra et al., 2013). Just like in
analyses from non-logarithmic space, the grid angle consistency effect for hexagonal
modulation was not significant in any ROI for logarithmic space, nor was this effect
larger in size for the 6-fold regressor than that observed for modulation at other
modulations (Suppl. Figure 4; Suppl. Figure 5).
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Supplementary figure 4. Effect of grid-angle consistency and SV in grid cell ROIs.
The top two panels show consistency effects and SV effects in ROIs defined by a
previous study by Constantinescu et al. (2016), the middle two show consistency effects
and SV effects in ROIs defined by the closest F-statistic peaks to coordinates of
Constantinescu et al. (2016). The left panels show ROIs in mPFC and the right two
panels show ROIs in ERC.
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Supplementary figure 5. Effect of grid-angle consistency and SV in SV-defined
ROIs. The left panel shows consistency effects and SV effects in mPFC ROI from Bartra
et al. (2013) and the right panel shows them in VS ROI from Bartra et al. (2013).
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Chapter 3 -- Timing of value representation in ventromedial
prefrontal cortex in a complex auction task
Abstract
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) has been shown to be involved in
value representations in many studies of decision-making. However, these past studies
have mostly focused on choices between options, with very little work concerning
preference tasks other than choice (such as ratings or auction tasks). As psychological
theories have posited that those types of tasks involve different cognitive mechanisms
compared to choice tasks, it is necessary to investigate whether the neural response to
decisions in auction tasks would reflect the same value-related representations as have
been found in choice tasks, and when those representations might occur. We conduct a
study where participants play an auction task in which they selected the amount they
would be willing to receive in exchange for a fixed amount of $75 at a variable delay. We
find that vmPFC and other regions in the value network correlated with the participant’s
bid, and that this representation occurred only at the end of the bidding period – i.e., the
time of the bid submission. Our study shows that vmPFC activity reflects the same valuebased process in a complex auction task as in choice tasks, and supports the view that
value is constructed.
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Introduction
Previous fMRI studies have shown that activity in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex is correlated with value across many different domains. Typically, participants in
these experiments are given a choice, usually between two options (Levy & Glimcher,
2012). These studies have shown that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is a region that
appears to overlap in reward representation for various categories of rewards including
foods, trinkets, attractive faces, and monetary gambles, with support for domain-general
valuation across both univariate studies and multivariate studies (Chib et al., 2009;
Howard et al., 2015; Pegors et al., 2015). This region thus may make common
comparisons between dissimilar goods (Bartra et al., 2013), and this representation scales
with a participant’s subjective preferences (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Tom et al., 2007).
Choices are, of course, not the only way people make decisions. We haggle over
treasures at a flea market, put a bid on a house, and rate products or services online.
These other forms of decisions have been studied in the laboratory using different kind of
auction, rating or matching tasks. Such studies have demonstrated that different cognitive
mechanisms can be engaged depending on the form of the decision. For instance,
participants assign greater weight to an attribute when it is compatible with the response
scale , or use a lexicographic step in choice but not matching tasks (Fischer & Hawkins,
1993; Tversky et al., 1988). Though this literature has made a clear case that decisions
can depend on the manner in which they are elicited, little is known about how preference
is expressed in the brain in tasks other than choice. Though several fMRI studies
technically involve ratings (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009) or auctions (Plassmann et
al., 2007), in these tasks there were only a few discrete responses (e.g., 5 point scale, or
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$0-$4) making them similar to a choice between four or five options. Whether the same
neural mechanisms are active in more complex and cognitively demanding auction or
matching tasks therefore remains an open question. Answering this question would
inform our understanding of how decisions may be constructed depending on the task
demands.
In this study, we ask participants to bid on monetary rewards at different delays
while measuring functional activity with BOLD fMRI. This task has two features of
interest that are novel. First, in this complex auction task there were a large array of
possible responses (from $0-$75; Cooper, Kable, Kim, and Zauberman (2013)), making
the task similar to bidding and matching tasks studied behaviorally. Second, the response
period for up to 10 seconds, so that the timing of neural signals within the task can be
reasonably studied given the temporal resolution of fMRI. Thus, we have a valuable
paradigm that is set to reveal the a) manner of value representation in a complex bidding
task and b) its onset during the decision process. With this task, we seek to answer two
questions: does the valuation network in the brain respond in a similar manner in this
auction task as it does during choice? And, if so, at which point in time during the task
does this signal occur?

Materials and Methods
Subjects.
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Forty participants (16 male; 88% right handed) were recruited for this study from
University of Pennsylvania and surrounding community. Participants had a mean age of
21.75 years (SD = 3.27 years). Participants were compensated for their time on two
testing sessions; they also received incentive payments based on their decisions in auction
task. All participants provided consent in accordance with the Institutional Review Board
of the University of Pennsylvania.
Task.
All subjects completed two sessions involving different tasks: a subjective time
estimation task (first session) and intertemporal decision-making task (second session).
The two sessions were separated by an average of 10 d (SD 5 d, range, 4-21 d). Only the
analysis of the latter task is discussed in this paper. For discussion of the subjective time
estimation task, as well as behavioral results from the intertemporal decison task, see
Cooper et al. (2013).
In the intertemporal decision task, participants bid on delayed monetary rewards.
They selected the amount they would be willing to receive immediately in exchange for a
fixed amount of $75 at a variable delay (e.g., “I feel indifferent between receiving $75 in
28d and receiving $? now”). Bids were entered using an interface that allowed subjects to
scroll through possible values. The bid amount always began at the maximum amount of
$75 now. Participant used two buttons to increase or decrease their bid and a third button
to submit their bid.
The intertrial interval was variable, between 0.5 and 13.5s. In the “question
period”, lasting 3s to 5s in duration, participants saw the delayed option they were asked
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to evaluate. They were not able to respond at this time. After this period terminated,
participants saw “$75 now” on the screen and could begin to adjust this amount and
select their bid. This “bidding period” lasted up to 10s. The amount on the screen when
the participants pressed the ‘submit’ key or when the 10s timed out was registered as the
participant’s response.
Participants knew that there was no penalty for not pressing the ‘submit’ key.
Because of this, several participants adopted the strategy of not pressing the ‘submit’ key
on some trials (22% of trials overall). Because the imaging analysis depended on having
accurate response time data, we excluded the trials in which no ‘submit’ key was pressed.
Three participants were excluded from analysis entirely due to a lack of sufficient valid
trials (two participants had below 13% of trials in which the ‘submit key’ was pressed;
the third participant had the same response of “$75 now” for every single trial).
Payments.
In addition to a flat $15 fee for participation, participants were paid according to
their bidding decisions using a incentive-compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak protocol
(Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964). A random trial was selected, and a random
“counteroffer” (between $0 and $75) was generated for that trial. If the participant’s bid
on that trial was greater than the counteroffer, they received $75 at the specified delay. If
the participant’s bid was below the counteroffer, they received the counteroffer amount
immediately. Using such a protocol, participants are incentivized to bid their true
valuations, as their bid affects the likelihood they will receive the item but not the price
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they will pay for it. All payments were made using prepaid debit cards (described in
Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Cooper et al., 2013).

MRI image acquisition.
Functional and anatomical images were collected using a 3T Siemens Trio scanner
equipped with an eight-channel head coil. T2*-weighted functional images were
collected using an EPI sequence (TR = 3s; TE = 30ms; 45 axial sices, 3 x 3 x 3mm; 64 x
64 matrix). Each scan consists of 150-152 images. All participants completed four scans
in each session. High resolution T1 weighted anatomical images were collected using an
MPRAGE sequence (TI = 1100ms; 160 axial slices, 0.9375 x 0.9375 x 1.000mm; 192 x
256 matrix).
Imaging data analysis.
Functional images were analyzed using FSL (Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens,
Woolrich, & Smith, 2012). Functional images were first interpolated in time to correct for
staggered slice acquisitions, corrected for head motion using a six-parameter rigid-body
transformations, and detrended and high-pass filtered (cutoff of 3 cycles/scan, or 0.0066
Hz) to remove low frequency drift in fMRI signal. Images were coregistered with each
subject’s high-resolution anatomical scan, and normalized into MNI space. Normalized
data were spatially smoothed (kernel FWHM = 5mm) and thresholded.
To further control for excessive motion, we discarded any functional run in which
> 5% of TRs exhibited > 0.5mm image-to-image displacement, and we discarded any
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subjects with fewer than 2 functional runs passing this quality control criterion. Four
additional subjects were excluded in this manner.
The general linear model for the intertemporal decision task contained 8
covariates of interest. These covariates modeled activity at the following four different
time points in the trial: 1) onset of the question period (Qon), the onset of the response
period (Ron), mid-point of the participant’s response (Rmid), and the time at which the
participant submitted the response (Roff). The first four regressors modeled the average
activity at each of these time points, while the next four included the participant’s bid on
each trial as a parametric modulator at these time points. The bid values were meancentered, and all regressors were convolved with a hemodynamic function included with
the FSL package. All of these regressors only included trials in which the participant
pressed the submit button. The model also included an additional 8 regressors of no
interest that duplicated the regressors named above, but for trials in which the participant
did not press the submit button.
Whole brain group analyses were assessed for significance using permutation
testing implemented by FSL’s randomise function. Corrected p-values were calculated by
sign-flipping the entire map with 5000 iterations, and the threshold-free-clusterenhancement (TFCE) method was used to form clusters without the need for an
arbitrarily defined cluster forming threshold (Smith & Nichols, 2009). Results were then
thresholded at the p = 0.05 level (two-tailed).

Region of interest analysis.
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We used regions of interest (ROIs) from Bartra et al. (2013), a quantitative meta-analysis
reporting value-related neural signals during decision-making. Our region of interest was
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (609 voxels at 3 x 3 x 3mm, centred on MNI coordinates 2, 40, and -8). We extracted the average z-value from each participant within the ROI,
and performed a one-sample t-test against 0.

Results

Whole brain analysis.
We first performed a whole-brain analysis testing for activity correlated with the
participant’s bid across four different time points within the auction task. We only found
neural correlates of value similar to those observed during choice tasks at the end of an
auction trial. At the first time point, that of question onset, we did not find any significant
activity. At the second time point, that of onset of the bid response period, we found
activity negatively correlated with the participant’s eventual bid in the occipital cortex.
At the third time point, midway through the bid response period, we found effects in both
visual and motor regions. Only at the final time point, that of response submission, did
we find widespread neural activity that was correlated with the participant’s bid,
including positive effects in classical areas of the valuation network, vmPFC and
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (Figure 1).
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Table 3-1: Peak foci of BOLD
effects
MNI coordinates
peak value
Region

x

y

z

# voxels

(z)

R. inf. Occipital

34

-90

-6

644

1.04

L. inf. Occipital

-28

94

-6

374

1.07

L. mid. Occipital

-44

-74

2

43

0.81

R. mid. temporal

48

-70

0

173

0.95

R. mid. Temporal pole

48

10

-32

7

0.75

L. Precentral gyrus

-36

-18

50

2473

0.88

L. sup. frontal gyrus

18

-10

70

404

0.85

Response onset
Negative effects

Response midperiod
Positive effects
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L. Rolandic operculum

-44

-2

10

88

0.75

L. mid cingulate

-8

14

34

24

0.62

L. inf. Operculum

-40

10

18

23

0.7

L. inf. Occipital

-28

-96

-6

570

1.38

R. inf. Occipital

30

-94

-4

340

1.44

R. mid. temporal

50

-72

4

38

1.04

VMPFC

2

50

16

6911

1.00

Cuneus

2

-84

34

1948

1.12

L. angular gyrus

52

-60

42

1209

0.96

R. angular gyrus

-54

-54

32

1115

1.13

R. inf. orbital gyrus

54

38

-6

554

0.86

R. mid temporal gyrus

60

-34

-6

531

0.94

Negative effects

Response offset
Positive effects

48

L. mid temporal gyrus

-62

-34

-8

268

0.85

PCC

-2

-44

34

238

0.93

L. Caudate

-18

18

18

63

0.73

L. superior temporal pole

-16

-42

18

30

0.82

R. SMA

8

18

68

9

0.65

L. Precentral gyrus

-58

8

24

20070

1.64

R. Occipital

26

-92

-6

2038

1.49

L. Occipital

-32

-92

-6

1013

1.49

Negative effects
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Figure 3-1 .Whole brain effects correlated with participants’ bid response on each
trial at the four time points in the trial. The boxes below each time point constitute
example screens of the event the participant sees at that time point, and the arrows in
between each event represent the average (with standard deviation in brackets) of the
intervals subjects experienced between each time point. The “Bid mid-period” event
represents the middle of the subject trial reaction time.

ROI results.
Region-of-interest analyses recapitulated these results, as activity in ventromedial
prefrontal cortex tracked the participant’s bid, but only near the completion of the trial
when the decision was registered. Across subjects, activity in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex was significantly correlated with the subject’s bid only at the time of bid
submission Roff; t(32) = 3.86; p = 0.0005), and not at any of the earlier time points in the
trial (Qon, (p = 0.16), Ron (p = 0.15), or Rmid (p=0.78)).
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***

Figure 3-2. Activity in the vmPFC ROI related to participant’s bid is only
significant at the final time point, that of bid response submission. Asterisks denote
significance at p < 0.001.
Discussion
In this paper, we measured neural activity during a complex auction task. Our
goals were twofold: first, to see whether the neural correlates of value routinely observed
in simpler choice tasks were also present during this form of decision; and, if so,
secondly to test when during the decision task such value correlates were observed. We
found that activity in the valuation network, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), was correlated with the participant’s bid,
but only late in the trial at the time of response submission. This result shows that the
brain’s valuation network does respond in a similar manner during an auction task as
during choice, but only does so near the conclusion of the decision process.
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Intriguingly, our results regarding the timing of value correlates at a longer
timescale during auctions mirrors those observed on a shorter timescale during choices.
Harris and colleagues have recorded EEG in several studies while participants made
value-based choices and found that value signals, putatively linked to the vmPFC,
typically appear late in the trial, around 500ms-800ms after stimulus onset (Harris et al.,
2011; Harris et al., 2018). Similarly, studies that have argued that vmPFC arrives at
choice through mutual inhibition between options have shown that activity in this region
reflects the comparison of values only at the end of the trial (Hunt et al., 2012; Hunt,
Woolrich, Rushworth, & Behrens, 2013; Jocham, Hunt, Near, & Behrens, 2012; Strait et
al., 2014). Thus, though our task involves a very different paradigm and takes place over
a longer period, our results are consistent with this body of evidence that signals related
to value are only manifest in vmPFC near the end of the decision process. To date there
are no neural models that would address the valuation mechanism in matching tasks. A
model from computational psychology, decision field theory (Johnson & Busemeyer,
2005), posits that, in matching tasks, participants mentally sample bid amounts and then
adjust them either downward (if the generated bid is too high) or upward (if bid is too
low) until an indifference threshold is reached. In the future, more work should be done
to investigate the neural evidence behind this theory.
Such a conclusion is broadly consistent with theories that value is computed or
constructed online during decision-making, instead of being “read off some master list”
(Tversky et al., 1988). However, Tversky et al. (1988) and much other work on
“constructed preferences” has also focused on how different modes of preference
elicitation – for example, choices versus auctions – occasion different types of cognitive
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processes (Payne et al., 1992). Even more dramatically, this work has shown violations of
procedural invariance, the principle that one’s preference between two options ought to
be the same no matter how you assess this. Instead, decision-makers can sometimes
express different contradictory, preferences in different response modes. One limitation
of our study is that we do not directly compare choice and auction tasks in the same
participants, so we cannot assess whether there are any differences in preferences across
the two response modes, nor can we link any such behavioral differences to changes in
activation in different brain regions. Clearly such investigations should be a priority for
future work.
Contrasting the results we observed in the vmPFC, we did not find valuecorrelated activity in ventral striatum in our auction task, which we would have expected
based on its status in the valuation network (Bartra et al., 2013; J. Peters & Büchel,
2010). The lack of signals in the ventral striatum may be due to the temporally extended
nature of our task. For instance, the persistence task in McGuire and Kable (2015) also
involves a prolonged period of waiting, and did not elicit value-correlated activity in
ventral striatum. These results add to a growing list of findings suggesting some
dissociations between vmPFC and ventral striatum during decision-making tasks (Hare et
al., 2008; Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007).
Critically, though, our results do convincingly show that there are some neural
processes in common across choice and auction tasks. We found that much of the same
core valuation network that exhibits value-correlated activity in choice tasks (Kable &
Glimcher, 2007), including regions like vmPFC and PCC, also exhibits activity correlated
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with the subject’s bid in this auction task. These results further establish the generality of
this network’s role in decision-making across a variety of tasks.
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Chapter 4 -- Individuals with ventromedial frontal damage
have more unstable but still fundamentally transitive
preferences
Yu, L.Q., Dana, J., & Kable, J.W. (2018). bioRxiv, 384024.
Abstract
Transitivity of preferences (i.e., if one prefers A over B, and B over C, one should
prefer A over C) is a hallmark of making rational, value-based decisions. Damage to the
ventromedial frontal lobes (VMF) has been shown in previous studies to increase
intransitive choice cycles (i.e., choosing A over B and B over C, but C over A). However,
past studies have examined transitivity by treating preferences as deterministic rather
than probabilistic, which could mask an important distinction in the critical role of the
VMF in value-based choices: are individuals with VMF damage prone to choosing
irrationally, or are they transitive, but simply more variable in what they prefer? We
present individuals with focal VMF damage, controls with other frontal damage, and
healthy controls with incentive compatible stimuli (artwork, brands of chocolate, and
gambles) and have them make repeated choices between all possible pairs. Using cutting
edge tests of a model of stochastic transitivity, and replicating previous analyses of
transitivity that treat preferences as deterministic, we find that individuals with VMF
damage made decisions consistent with stochastic transitivity. We also replicate previous
findings that these individuals more frequently violate deterministic notions of
transitivity. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that individuals with VMF
damage are not, in fact, more irrational, but do have noisier preferences. The implication
is that the VMF is critical to maintaining the stability of preferences across time and
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context during decision-making, rather than for the ability for choices to reflect
preferences at all.

Introduction
A central assumption of many theories of choice is that decision-makers compare
different options on a single dimension of subjective value and choose the highest valued
option. Satisfying this assumption is equivalent to the observed choices being transitive
(Samuelson, 1937). An example of transitivity is the following: if you choose to listen to
Adele (A) over Britney Spears (B), and Britney over Celine Dion (C), then you would
also choose Adele (A) over Celine (C). There is a strong argument that choices ought to
be transitive, as an intransitive chooser could be exploited (e.g., as a “money pump”) and
would get caught in choice cycles that do not advance towards any goal. Given this, one
might expect that organisms develop internal representations of subjective value to
ensure transitivity. Key studies in neuroeconomics have identified neural signals in the
ventromedial frontal lobe (VMF) that scale with subjective value across different goods,
in the firing rate of single neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex in monkeys (PadoaSchioppa & Assad, 2006) and in the BOLD signal of ventromedial prefrontal cortex in
humans (Bartra et al., 2013; Levy & Glimcher, 2012).
Consistent with the idea that neural signals in the VMF support value
maximization, inconsistency has long been recognized as a hallmark of VMF damage:
Phineas Gage was “capricious and vacillating” (Harlow, 1868) and EVR would drive on
a single street for hours trying to decide on a restaurant (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985).
More recently, individuals with VMF damage have been shown to make more
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intransitive choices than healthy controls or individuals with damage elsewhere in the
frontal lobe (Camille et al., 2011; Fellows & Farah, 2007; Henri-Bhargava et al., 2012).
In the above example with the songstresses, an individual with VMF damage would be
more likely to choose C(eline) over A(dele).
Axioms of rational choice, like transitivity, are usually stated deterministically. In
contrast, behavior in experiments is probabilistic, because people can make different
choices given the same pair of options over time (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1980;
Regenwetter, Dana, & Davis-Stober, 2011; Tversky, 1969). There are different ways to
recast transitivity in probabilistic terms (Regenwetter et al., 2011; Tversky, 1969);
however, testing any probabilistic model requires observing repeated choices over many
instances of the same stimulus pairs. Noting a cycle (e.g., choosing C over A when one
has chosen A over B and B over C) is not sufficient to disentangle whether one has
fundamentally intransitive preferences versus variable preferences.
Previous studies have only asked individuals with VMF damage about their
preferences between each pair of stimuli a single time. Therefore, the greater tendency of
individuals with VMF damage to make intransitive choices in these experiments is
consistent with two very different possibilities from a probabilistic perspective. One
possibility is that the choices of individuals with VMF damage are fundamentally
intransitive. In this case, their choices would not satisfy probabilistic notions of
transitivity (e.g., by consistently and reliably choosing C > A above). This could occur if
individuals with VMF damage chose according to stimulus-response associations or rules
that lack any higher order transitive structure, such as the lexicographic semiorder
heuristic (Tversky, 1969). A second possibility is that the choices of individuals with
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VMF damage are fundamentally transitive, but noisier. In this case, their choices would
satisfy probabilistic notions of transitivity despite violating deterministic notions more
often (e.g., they might choose A over C above with greater than 50% probability, but not
100% of the time). This could occur if individuals with VMF damage chose according to
underlying values, but did so less reliably.
Here we test which of these two possibilities holds. The answer is both clinically
relevant, as it sheds light on the nature of “capricious and vacillating” behavior after
VMF damage, and theoretically relevant, as it determines whether VMF is necessary for
choices to reliably reflect underlying values or for choices to be value-based at all.

Materials and Methods
Experimental design.
Participants. Fourteen individuals with focal damage to the frontal lobes were
recruited from the Focal Lesion Database (FoLD) at the University of Pennsylvania, and
ten were recruited from the Cognitive Neuroscience Research Registry at McGill
University (Fellows, Stark, Berg, & Chatterjee, 2008). Individuals were eligible to
participate if they had a lesion primarily affecting the frontal lobes. One individual was
excluded due to incomplete data collection (the individual completed one session and was
not able to be scheduled for the second). Fourteen females and 9 males were included in
the final sample. Participants were tested a minimum of 5 months after injury (median =
10.29 years, range: 5 months to 17.75 years).
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Participants were divided into two groups a priori based on location of damage,
assessed with MR or computed tomography images by a neurologist blind to task
performance. The ventromedial frontal lobe (VMF) group consisted of individuals who
sustained damage to the VMF, while the frontal control group (FC) consisted of
individuals who sustained damage to the frontal lobe sparing the VMF. Lesions were
drawn on a common space [Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain] by neurologists
at the research sites blind to task performance. The overlap images for the groups are
found in Figure 1. Damage in the VMF group was caused by aneurysm or subarachnoid
hemorrhage in 5 cases, stroke in 2 cases, tumor resection in 3 cases, glioma in one case,
and meningioma in 2 cases. Damage in the FC group was caused by hemorrhage, stroke
or infarct in 7 cases, glioma in 2 cases, and meningioma in one case.
Age and education matched healthy controls (HC) were recruited from the
corresponding Normal Control Databases of the University of Pennsylvania (N = 14) and
McGill University (N = 6), including 15 females and 5 males (Table 1). They were free
of neurological and psychiatric disorders. All subjects provided informed consent and
were compensated for their time. The study protocol was approved by the institutional
review boards of both the University of Pennsylvania and McGill University.
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Figure 4-1. Overlap images of the VMF and frontal control lesion groups. Numbers
below slices indicate the MNI z-coordinates. Colors indicate extent of overlap. L = left; R
= right.
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Table 4-1. Demographics of participants.

Group
(n)

Gender

Mean age (sd)

Education in
yrs

VMF (13)

7F:6M

59 (15)

14

FC (10)

7F:3M

66 (8)

14

HC (12)

15F:5M

62 (8)

15

Apparatus. All tasks were programmed using EPrime 2.0 (Psychology Software
Tools). Participants were tested at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, at the
MNI, or at their own home in the greater Philadelphia or Montreal area. Participants saw
stimuli on a laptop monitor and responded using the 1 and 0 keys of the keyboard.
Stimuli. Stimuli consisted of images of artwork, chocolate bars, and pie charts
representing gambles. There were two sets of stimuli: 10-11 stimuli for each of the
categories (10 for chocolate bar brands, 11 for art and gambles) used in non-repeated
choices that allow deterministic tests of transitivity (set A), and 5 stimuli for each of the
categories (art, chocolate bar brands, gambles) used in repeated choices that allow
probabilistic tests of transitivity (set B). Choices constructed using set A and set B stimuli
were intermingled in each block. For each category, we strove to design option sets in
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which the options were close in preference, as intransitive choices are less likely between
items that have widely different values.
The artwork stimuli were paintings that were rated highly by participants in
Vaidya and Fellows (2015a). The set B stimuli consisted of 5 paintings by Monet, which
were all within the top 20 most highly rated paintings by those subjects. We selected
Monet as he was the artist that occurred most frequently in the top 20 rated paintings of
Vaidya and Fellows (2015a). The 5 selected paintings were roughly similarly preferred
(i.e., chosen with close to the same frequency in pair-wise choices across the whole
sample) in a sample of 107 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Set A
consisted of paintings of the similar style/era (Impressionist, Romantic periods) in the top
40 ranked paintings of the Vaidya and Fellows (2015a) stimuli set.
The chocolate bars were from five brands (Lindt, Godiva, Ghirardelli, Dove, and
Cadbury). We selected five brands that were roughly similarly preferred across the
population. These brands were being sold for similar prices, were rated similarly on a
seven-point scale by a sample of 103 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mean
rating = 5.76), and were selected at roughly similar frequencies in pair-wise choices
across another sample of 101 Mechanical Turk participants. Milk chocolate bars from
each of the 5 brands were in set B, while dark chocolate and dark chocolate almond bars
from each brand were in set A. The stimuli consisted of publicly available pictures of the
front side of the chocolate bar packaging.
We used sixteen gambles of equal expected value ($8.80). The stimuli consisted
of a pie chart showing the probability of winning, with text on top indicating both the
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cash amount to be won and the probability of winning. The five set B gambles were the
“Cash II” set in Regenwetter et al. (2011), which used contemporary monetary
equivalents of the Tversky (1969) five gamble set. The probabilities were 28%, 32%,
36%, 40%, and 44%. Set A consisted of 11 other gambles with the same expected value
(probabilities of 8%, 17%, 25%, 33%, 42%, 50%, 58%, 67%, 75%, 83%, 92%).
Procedure. Participants completed a binary forced choice task. On each trial,
participants first saw a central fixation point for 1s, then a screen with two choice stimuli
(placed to the left and the right of the center). Participants indicated which stimulus they
preferred, by pressing buttons for left or right. Participants had as much time as they
needed to make their selection. Following their selection, there was an inter-trial interval
of 1s where a black screen was presented.
For set A stimuli, participants faced all possible pairings of either 10 (for brands)
or 11 (for art and gambles) options, constituting 45 and 55 pairs in total, respectively.
Each pair was faced once. For set B stimuli, participants faced all possible pairings of 5
options, constituting 10 pairs, and each pair was repeated 15 times. Therefore, there were
195 (for brands) or 205 (for art and gambles) total choices in each category across the
entire experiment.
Choice trials were presented in blocks, in which participants made choices
between items within a single category (art, brands, gambles). There were five blocks of
choices for each category, containing 39 (for brands) or 41 (for art and gambles) trials
each. Each block contained 9 or 11 choices composed from set A and 30 choices
composed from set B. Choices from set A and set B were intermingled with each other
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within a block, with the set A stimuli inserted into a block of B stimuli in positions
randomly selected from a uniform distribution.
We took a number steps to reduce any potential memory effects for choices constructed
with set B stimuli. We designed the sequence of trials so that: (1) the same pairing was
not repeated within a minimum of 3 trials; (2) the same stimulus rarely appeared on
immediately adjacent trials (no more than 9 times throughout the entire experiment); and
(3) when the same pairing was repeated the choices immediately preceding and following
that pairing differed from its previous occurrence (to minimize contextual memory).
Furthermore, the side on which stimuli were presented was counterbalanced across
repetitions. Finally, we divided the experiment into two sessions, held on separate days
for every subject except two (due to scheduling constraints). The two sessions were held
on average 8.09 (sd = 11.73) days apart (excepting the two who were tested on the same
day, the sessions ranged from 1 day to 57 days apart). We did not observe a significant
correlation between total number of intransitive choices made across all participants (see
explanation of measure below) and days between the two sessions (r = 0.24, p = 0.12).
Statistical analysis.
Deterministic tests of transitivity. All data was analyzed with MATLAB
(Mathworks). We used the set A choices to perform deterministic tests of transitivity,
replicating previous studies. We first determined the preference ordering within each
category for each subject. The 10 or 11 options within each category were ranked
according to how many times each was chosen by that subject. Then, for each trial, a
choice was counted as intransitive if a lower-ranked item was chosen over a higherranked item. Following Henri-Bhargava et al. (2012), ties were maintained in the
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rankings (i.e., more than option could have the same rank) to provide a more conservative
definition of intransitive choices. Because the intransitive choice counts are not normally
distributed, we used non-parametric statistics to test for group differences. We used
Kruskal-Wallis tests to detect effects between groups, followed by one-tailed Wilcoxon
ranked sum post hoc pairwise tests as appropriate (as several previous studies have found
increased intransitive choices after VMF damage, we had strong hypotheses about the
direction of the results). To test for within-subject effects, we used repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on rank-transformed data for the omnibus test and
Wilcoxon signed-rank post hoc tests as appropriate.
Probabilistic tests of transitivity. We used the set B choices to perform
probabilistic tests of transitivity, extending on previous studies. We first obtained the
proportion of choices (out of a possible total of 15 choices) for each of the 10 choice
pairs afforded by all possible pairings of the 5 options in each category. We then tested
the random mixture model of preference by noting whether the choices violated the linear
ordering polytope (LOP) (Regenwetter et al., 2011). The random mixture model states
that a person’s response comes from a probability distribution over all possible orderings
of the stimuli. Thus, at any one time, preferences are transitive, but the transitive state
that one is in can vary. The probability of a person choosing one option (X) over another
(Y) in a binary choice is the sum of all the preference states in which X is preferred to Y.
In a two alternative forced choice task, this is constrained by the triangle inequalities. For
every distinct X, Y, and Z in a choice set:

Pxy + P yz – P xz £ 1
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Where Pxy denotes the probability of choosing X over Y, etc. For up to 5 options in a
2AFC task, satisfying the triangle inequalities, which together define the LOP, is
necessary and sufficient for a set of choices to be consistent with the random mixture
model.
For choice probabilities that did not satisfy the triangle inequalities, we used the Q-test
(Regenwetter et al., 2014) software to determine whether the data were significantly
outside of the LOP. Q-test uses maximum likelihood estimation to find the goodness of
fit of the data at each vertex in the polytope, using a chi-squared bar distribution with
simulated weights (Regenwetter, Dana, & Davis-Stober, 2010; Regenwetter et al., 2014).
Any subject with choices in a category that produced p < 0.05 in this test were
considered as significantly violating the LOP and thus, the random mixture model of
preference.
Sensitivity of probabilistic tests. We performed several simulations to determine
the sensitivity of the probabilistic test of transitivity, i.e., the rate at which this test would
declare different forms of random or heuristic-based choice to be transitive. First,
following Regenwetter et al. (2011), we randomly picked a choice probability for every
pair from a uniform distribution (from 0 to 100%). As previously shown in Regenwetter
et al. (2011), only about 5% of the choice datasets simulated in this manner satisfy the
triangle inequalities. That is, only 5% of the possible set of choice proportions for 10
pairs/5 stimuli satisfy the random mixture model.
Second, we simulated an intransitive chooser who has an entirely consistent
preference within each pair (i.e., choosing A 100% of time when it is paired with B) that
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is unconstrained by any higher order transitive structure (i.e., the preference in each pair
is independent from that of all other pairs). This type of intransitive chooser only satisfies
the triangle inequalities about 12% of the time for choice proportions for 10 pairs/5
stimuli as in our dataset.
Third, we simulated an intransitive chooser using the lexicographic semiorder
heuristic (LS; Tversky, 1969). The LS heuristic is easiest to demonstrate with the
gambles stimulus set. Following Tversky (1969), we defined our LS rule as follows: if
two gambles are adjacent (i.e., next to each other in the set in terms of
probabilities/payouts), always choose the gamble with the higher payout (amount); for all
other (non-adjacent) gamble pairs, always select the gamble with the higher probability.
Such a chooser would never satisfy the triangle inequalities in our dataset. Together, the
first three sets of simulations show that our probabilistic test is very sensitive to different
forms of intransitive choice.
Finally, we simulated a completely random chooser (i.e., someone who flips a
coin on every single trial). The choice proportions for such a random chooser are given
by the binomial probabilities with p=0.5. Such a chooser satisfies the triangle inequalities
80% of the time in our dataset (5 stimuli, 10 choice pairs repeated 15 times). This high
percentage is not unexpected, as 50% choice probabilities across all pairs is consistent
with the random mixture model (i.e., 0.5 + 0.5 -0.5 < 1). We use this rate below to assess
whether the behavior of VMF subjects is consistent with completely random choice.
Drift diffusion modelling and analysis of reaction times. We calculated ranks of
options similar to the method we used in the set A (deterministic transitivity) above,
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where the option that was chosen most often overall was ranked first, and the option
chosen second-most was ranked second, etc., and broke ties by looking at which options
were more often chosen more than half of the time in every pair (Henri-Bhargava et al.,
2012). It was necessary to break ties here for the purposes of calculating the effect of
value distance on reaction times (RTs). Three subjects still had tied ranks after this
process, in one category each: two are HC subjects in the gambles domain, the other is a
VMF patient from the Art domain. These subjects in these categories only are dropped
from the ANOVA analysis and drift diffusion modelling below.
We fit a drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) to the choices and RTs from all set B
choices for every other subject and category in our experiment. We modelled the decision

a
process as a decision variable (DV) that increased linearly with a slope d*v , where d
was the drift rate, v was the value difference of the options (expressed as the absolute
rank difference between the two items for that individual), and a was an exponent
accounting for potential non-linearities in the effect of rank difference. We also assume
that at each time step there is Gaussian noise added to the DV, with a standard deviation
of e. We assumed 10ms time steps. We also assume there is a non-decision time (ndt)
before accumulation begins, and an initial value (int) of the DV that is constant across
trials. Choices are made when the DV crosses a threshold.
Thus there are five free parameters: d, a, e , int and ndt. Note that the threshold was a
fixed parameter across subjects, as one of the threshold, d, or e must be fixed for the other
two parameters to be estimable. We chose to fix threshold after a model-comparison
process showed that option to provide the best model fits. Threshold was held constant at
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(+/-) 0.15. Values for d are sampled between 0 and 1, for e are sampled between 0 and 1,
for a are sampled between 0 and 3, for int are sampled between the threshold bounds,
and for ndt are sampled between 0 and the minimum RT minus 10ms for that subject.
To fit these free parameters, we first calculated the cumulative probability that the DV
crossed the threshold for the subject’s choice (Tcorrect or Tincorrect, where “correct” was
defined as choosing the option of higher rank) across all time steps. For each trial, we
then calculated the joint likelihood of the subject’s choice at the time which they made
that choice (their trial RT, minus ndt), by taking the derivative of this cumulative
probability at the timestep of the subject’s choice (every 10ms to the maximum RT for
the subject). The model was then fit using the MATLAB function fmincon, where the
cost function was defined as the sum of the negative log likelihoods of the instantaneous
probabilities of the subject’s choices and RTs in all trials. The fitting procedure was
repeated 10 times for each subject, with each iteration varying in randomly sampled
starting values for the free parameters as specified above; the parameters with the lowest
log likelihood out of the 10 was taken for that subject. The model was fit individually to
each of the three reward categories (art, brands, gambles) for each subject.
To look at differences in DDM parameters between groups across categories, we
performed a mixed ANOVA on each of the free parameters, with group as the crosssubject factor and reward category as the within-subject factor.
Finally, we performed a mixed ANOVA with group and value distance as factors
to look for the effect of value distance on RTs across groups.
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Results
Deterministic tests of transitivity.
Individuals with frontal damage exhibit more choice cycles. A subset of the choices in
our experiment, Set A, consists of a single instance of all pairwise choices from a total of
nine or ten items within a category, which allows us to first replicate two previous studies
of transitivity (Fellows and Farah, 2007; Henri-Bhargava et al., 2012). Combining all
three categories (art, brands, gambles) in our experiment, we replicate the finding that
individuals with VMF damage make more intransitive choices, though we do not
replicate that this effect is selective to VMF damage in the frontal lobe (Figure 2). There
was a moderate difference in intransitive choices in set A summed across all three
categories (Kruskal-Wallis H = 5.05, p = 0.08). Because three previous studies have
found increased intransitive choices after VMF damage (Fellows and Farah, 2007; HenriBhargava et al., 2012; Camille et al., 2011), we conducted planned comparisons between
groups. Similar to previous studies, our VMF group (mean = 9.93%, sd =6.65) made
more intransitive choices than the HC group (mean = 5.71%, sd = 4.05; Wilcoxon ranked
sums Z = 1.64, p = 0.05). Unlike previous studies though, our FC group (mean = 9.09%,
sd = 3.74) also made more intransitive choices than the HC group (Z = 2.05, p = 0.02)
and the difference between VMF and FC and was not significant (Z = 0.12, p = 0.45).
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Figure 4-2. Group average and individually plotted intransitive choices in
(deterministic) set A across a) all domains, and b-c) in each reward domain. Filled-in
dots encircled in gray denote the VMF subjects whose errors were significantly higher
compared to the HC group, and whose lesion extents are depicted in Figure 3. Error bars
are standard errors of the mean.
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Differences among reward categories. However, the analysis above obscures
differences across individuals and choice categories that point to more specific effects of
VMF damage. We first examined how intransitive choices in set A differ across choice
categories. In the one choice category used in previous studies of transitivity, art, there
was significant difference in intransitive choices across groups (Kruskal-Wallis H = 7.62,
p = 0.02), which replicated the previously reported pattern of selective VMF deficit. The
VMF group (mean = 9.93%, sd = 1.86) made significantly more intransitive choices in
the art category than both the FC group (mean = 4.73%, sd = 1.36; Wilcoxon ranked sum
Z = 1.91, p = 0.03) and the HC group (mean = 3.64%, sd = 0.97; Wilcoxon ranked sum Z
= 2.62, p = 0.004). In contrast, in the two categories that have not been used in previous
studies, brands and gambles, we did not find significant differences between the three
groups (brands, H = 2.42, p = 0.29; gambles, H = 3.01, p = .22 respectively).
In Figure 2b-d, it appears that number of intransitive choices is relatively stable
across categories in the VMF and HC groups, but variable across categories in the FC
group. Indeed, the effect of reward category is significant for the FC group (F(2,18) =
3.88, p = 0.04), but not for the VMF (p = 0.92) or the HC group (p = 0.27). In the FC
group, the number of intransitive choices in the gamble category was significantly greater
than in the art category (Z = 2.40, p = 0.02), while the differences between gambles and
brands (p = 0.19) and art and brands (p = 0.18) were not significant.
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Differences among individuals. We then examined how intransitive choices in
set A differ across individuals. To do this, we considered each individual with a VMF or
FC lesion as a single case, and compared their total number of intransitive choices (i.e.,
across all three categories) against healthy controls. We made this comparison using
case-control t-tests (Crawford & Howell, 1998) which are modified to compare an
individual against a normative group when the sample size is small. In the VMF group,
four individuals made significantly more intransitive choices than healthy controls,
before corrections for multiple comparisons (Subject 350: t(19) = 2.04, p = 0.03; Subject
10403: t(19) = 3.28,p = 0.002, Subject 12402: t(19) = 3.13, p = 0.003; Subject 775: t(19)
= 3.13, p = 0.003). These differences remained significant in the latter three individuals
after correcting for multiple comparisons using FDR (corrected p = 0.023 for all three
individuals). Lesion extent of these three subjects are shown in Figure 3. In contrast, in
the FC group, none of the individuals made significantly more intransitive choices than
healthy controls (all p >= 0.05 before multiple comparison correction).
This result suggests that a subset of individuals with VMF damage show the most
pronounced increase in intransitive choices. However, we did not find evidence to
support any particular account of this heterogeneity. The total number of intransitive
choices (i.e., across all three categories) was not significantly correlated with lesion size
(in cc’s), whether considering all subjects with lesions (Spearman’s rho = -0.14, p =
0.51) or only those with VMF damage (rho = -0.13, p = 0.67). Within the VMF group,
the total number of intransitive choices was also not significantly correlated with lesion
volume within a vmPFC mask defined based on value effects in fMRI studies (Bartra,
McGuire & Kable, 2013; rho = -0.06, p = 0.83). Finally, across all subjects, the total
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number of intransitive choices was not significantly correlated with any of the
demographic variables (gender, point biserial r = 0.13, p = 0.39; age, rho = 0.14, p =
0.35; education, rho = 0.24, p = 0.11).
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Figure 4-3. Lesion tracings of the three individuals with VMF lesions who had
significantly more intransitive choices compared to healthy control subjects, as
determined by case-control t-tests. Red denotes areas where at least one of these
subjects had a lesion; yellow denotes the areas where at least one of these subjects had
lesions outside of all other lesion subjects. There was very little overlap in lesions within
the three subjects (only maximally two out of three on only in a small number of voxels).
Numbers below axial slices indicate the MNI z-coordinates.
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Probabilistic tests of transitivity. Individuals with VMF damage make choices
consistent with probabilistic models of transitivity. After replicating the finding that
individuals with VMF damage make an increased number of intransitive choices, we next
turned to the central question motivating our study, which is whether or not the choices of
these individuals violate probabilistic notions of transitivity. To do this, we examined the
subset of choices in our experiment, Set B, which involve 15 repetitions each of 10
different binary choices in each of the three categories. Set B provides sufficient data for
evaluating whether the choices each participant made are consistent with the random
mixture model, a probabilistic model of transitive choice. None of the individuals with
VMF damage violated the random mixture model in any of the three domains (a total of
39 tests, see Table 2). Similarly, none of the individuals with frontal damage outside the
VMF violated the random mixture model in any of the three domains (a total of 36 tests).
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Table 4-2. Results of LOP analysis, by category

Respondent

Art

Brands

Gambles

p-value

p-value

p-value

Individuals with VMF lesions
1

✓

✓

✓

2

✓

✓

0.64

3

✓

✓

0.83

4

✓

✓

✓

5

✓

✓

✓

6

✓

✓

✓

7

✓

0.57

✓

8

✓

✓

✓

9

✓

✓

0.92

10

✓

✓

✓

11

✓

✓

✓

12

✓

✓

✓

1

0.2

✓

✓

2

✓

✓

✓

3

✓

✓

✓

4

✓

✓

✓

5

✓

✓

0.57

6

✓

✓

✓

7

✓

✓

0.48

Frontal controls
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8

✓

✓

0.36

9

✓

✓

0.14

10

✓

✓

✓

1

✓

0.71

2

✓

✓

0.9

3

✓

✓

✓

4

✓

✓

✓

5

✓

✓

✓

6

✓

✓

✓

7

✓

✓

✓

8

✓

✓

0.95

9

✓

✓

0.01

10

✓

✓

0.55

11

✓

✓

✓

12

✓

✓

0.09

13

✓

✓

✓

14

✓

✓

✓

15

0.24

✓

✓

16

✓

0.87

17

✓

✓

✓

18

✓

0.36

✓

19

✓

✓

0.26

20

✓

✓

✓

Healthy controls
0.0016

Note: Each participant participated in choices for all three categories.
Checkmark indicates subject fulfilled triangle inequalities for that category. Significant
violations of linear ordering polytope are marked in bold.
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0.27

Interestingly, two healthy controls significantly violated the random mixture
model in the gambles domain (p = 0.002 and p = 0.01, respectively). One of these
individuals followed Tversky’s (1969) lexicographic semiorder heuristic exactly and the
other followed this heuristic partially. Their results demonstrate the sensitivity of our test
to detect individuals choosing on the basis of attribute-based heuristics that lack higher
order transitive structure.
Individuals with VMF damage are not choosing randomly. One possible
explanation for why individuals with VMF damage conform to probabilistic models of
transitivity despite making a greater number of individual intransitive choices is that they
are simply choosing randomly, as completely random choices fulfill the random mixture
model 80% of the time in our experimental design (see methods). However, individuals
with VMF damage are not simply choosing randomly. First, the probability that a group
of random choosers the size of the VMF group (N=13) would all make choices consistent
with the random mixture model in all three domains is extremely low, p = 1.66e-04.
Second, we can evaluate directly the likelihood that an individual is choosing randomly
by comparing their choice proportions (N=10 in each category) against those expected
under the binomial distribution. For every single individual with VMF damage, and in all
three domains, the likelihood that their choice proportions arose from completely random
choice was extremely low (all p < 1e-06).
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Individuals with VMF damage do not have systematically different
preferences. A second possible explanation for why individuals with VMF damage
conform to probabilistic models of transitivity despite making a greater number of
individual intransitive choices is that they have systematically different preferences. For
example, we might expect that a risk-neutral chooser would be more likely to make
occasional intransitive choices in our gambles category than a strongly risk averse
chooser. However, individuals in the VMF group did not make systematically different
types of choices than individuals in the other groups. In a MANOVA on the choice
proportions for each of the 10 binary choices the participants faced in each category,
there were no significant differences between groups in the art category [Wilks’ Lambda
= 0.64, F(18,64) = 0.9, p = 0.58], the brand category [Wilks = 0.64, F(18,64)=0.90, p =
0.58], or the gambles category [Wilks = 0.46, F(18,64) = 1.67, p = 0.07].
Individuals with VMF damage have noisier preferences. A third possible
explanation for why individuals with VMF damage conform to probabilistic models of
transitivity despite making a greater number of individual intransitive choices is that they
are noisier choosers. That is, their choices reflect underlying transitive preference
orderings, but they vacillate among preference orderings more than other choosers. To
further test this possibility, we fit each individual’s choices and RTs in Set B to a drift
diffusion model (DDM), which assumed that choices and RTs were a probabilistic
function of the rank distance in preference ordering between the two options. These fits
revealed that individuals with VMF damage were noisier choosers. The only parameter of
the DDM that was significantly different across groups was the noise parameter e
[F(2,37) = 6.25, p = 0.005]. Specifically, the VMF group (mean = 0.12, sd = 0.03) had
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significantly higher e than HC (mean = 0.09, sd = 0.04)[t(28) = 2.08, p = 0.047] and FC
(mean = 0.07, sd = 0.02) [t(20) = 3.94, p < 0.001]. No other parameters differed between
the three groups (Figure 4).

Figure 4-4. DDM parameter fits: noise, drift rate, initial starting point, non-decision
time, and alpha (exponent on rank distance). Error bars are standard errors of the
mean.

81

Individuals with VMF damage show a less pronounced effect of value on
reaction times. RTs in individuals with VMF damage also showed a less pronounced
effect of ranked value distance, consistent with the increased noise parameter observed in
the DDM fits. We performed a mixed ANOVA on median RTs with value distance and
group as factors. We found a significant main effect of value distance [F(3, 111) = 28.63,
p < 0.0001], a significant main effect of group [F(2,37) = 4.93; p = 0.01], and a
significant interaction between the two [F(6,111) = 3.76; p = 0.002].
The significant effect of value distance reflected the expected decrease in RTs as the
distance in preference ordering rank gets larger. The average median RT for a rank
difference of 1 (mean = 2800ms, sd = 1458) was significantly slower than a rank
difference of 2 (mean = 2500ms, sd = 1211) [Z = 4.86, p <0.0001], which in turn was
slower than the rank difference of 3 (mean = 2300ms, sd = 1166) [Z = 3.59, p <0.001],
which in turn was slower than a rank difference of 4 (mean = 2180ms, sd = 1045) [Z =
2.78, p=0.005].
The effect of group reflected longer RTs in the FC group. RTs in the FC group
(mean = 3380ms, sd = 1596 ms) were significantly slower than in VMF group (mean =
1883ms, sd = 469ms) (Z = 3.13, p = 0.002), and a similar slowing relative to the HC
group (mean = 2439ms, sd = 1116ms) exhibited a non-significant trend (Z = 1.70, p =
0.09). RTs in the VMF and HC groups were not significantly different (Z = 1.16, p =
0.24).

82

The interaction between value distance and group reflected a reduced effect of
value distance on RTs in the VMF group. We took the Spearman correlation between RT
and the difference in preference ordering rank as an index of the value distance effect.
The VMF group (mean rho = -0.16) exhibited a flatter value distance-RT relationship
than the HC group (mean rho = -0.22) [t(28) = 2.20; p = 0.04]. The value distance-RT
relationship in the FC group (mean rho = -0.19) was intermediate and not significantly
different from the VMF (p = 0.42) or HC (p = 0.61) groups. As shown in Figure 5, these
differences can be accounted for by the DDM fits described above.
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Figure 4-5. Value distance effect on RT, by group. Dotted line are simulated RTs from
DDM parameter fits. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.

84

Discussion
Individuals with damage to the ventromedial frontal lobes (VMF) have been
shown previously to be more inconsistent in their choices (Camille et al., 2011; Fellows
& Farah, 2007; Henri-Bhargava et al., 2012). These previous findings, however, are
consistent with two possible patterns of behavior, with very different implications for the
function of the VMF. One possibility is that individuals with VMF damage are
fundamentally intransitive: that they reliably choose in an intransitive manner when given
the same choice between the same options repeatedly. A second possibility is that
individuals with VMF damage are more variable in their choices, yet still fundamentally
transitive. Here we distinguished between these two possibilities by testing whether the
choices of individuals with VMF damage satisfy probabilistic notions of transitivity, as
the first possibility predicts they do not and second predicts they do. We overwhelmingly
find evidence for the second possibility, as all individuals with VMF damage make
choices in all domains that are consistent with probabilistic models of transitivity.
The first possibility, that individuals with VMF damage are fundamentally
intransitive choosers, implies that the VMF is necessary for choices to be value-based, as
transitivity is the key hallmark of a value-based choice (Samuelson, 1937; Von Neumann
& Morgenstern, 1945). According to this view, individuals with VMF damage would
only be able to choose in a non-value-based manner, for example, according to rules or
heuristics. Our data, however, provide strong evidence against this possibility. This result
is difficult to reconcile with the view that VMF is the critical substrate for value-based
choice.
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In contrast, we found strong evidence for the second possibility, that individuals
with VMF damage are fundamentally transitive, that is their choices satisfy probabilistic
models of transitivity, even though they make more intransitive choices according to
deterministic notions of transitivity. Furthermore, we showed that this pattern was not
due to individuals with VMF damage choosing in an entirely randomly manner, nor was
it due to these individuals having preferences that were systematically different from
those of the other groups. Rather, this pattern was due to individuals with VMF damage
being noisier or more variable choosers. This is consistent with the suggestion of HenriBhargava et al. (2012), that “values are unstable, fluctuating from trial to trial in those
with VMF damage.” We illustrated this by fitting a drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978)
to each individual’s choices. In this model, the VMF group had a significantly higher
noise term, i.e., more variance around the decision variable, than healthy individuals or
those with frontal damage outside the VMF. Importantly, the VMF group did not differ
on the value of any other parameters. Reaction times in the VMF group were also similar
to healthy controls, arguing against accounts of their behavior based on impulsivity
(faster RTs) or indecision (slower RTs). Overall our modeling further strengthens the
conclusion that the VMF serves to make preferences more stable, so that individuals
would be less likely to select an option that is typically less preferred.
These results are easier to reconcile with a framework in which valuation and
value-based choice are distributed processes, to which multiple regions of the brain
contribute in some respect (Hunt & Hayden, 2017). This framework would predict that
others regions can compensate for damage to the VMF, so that such damage does not
fundamentally abolish the transitivity of preferences. The modest effect size in
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deterministic tests, which is typically an increase of around 5% in the number of
intransitive choices in the VMF group relative to control groups in our study and previous
ones (Fellows & Farah, 2007; Henri-Bhargava et al., 2012), is also more consistent with
this view. As making transitive choices that maximize value is incredibly important to the
survival of an organism, it would make sense that value is a highly conserved process that
is not abolished by damage to one part of the cortex. Future studies could more directly
test hypotheses about compensation by examining activity in inconsistent individuals
with fMRI, as it is also possible that regions that compensate are in the still intact parts of
VMF rather than in other regions entirely.
Our results do not speak to how exactly the VMF supports choice stability. One
possibility is that VMF contributes some part of the composition of subjective value. If
subjective value is computed through the interaction of several brain regions, the loss of
VMF may make this computation noisier and less reliable, akin to the greater noise we
see in our DDM results. Alternatively, as a flattening of the value distance-RT
relationship is consistent with greater indifference between options, the VMF could
amplify or enhance the differences in value between different options (Henri-Bhargava et
al., 2012). It is also possible that the VMF contributes a unique, specific component to
valuation. For example, it has been suggested that the VMF contributes emotional content
when making aesthetic judgments (Vaidya, Sefranek, & Fellows, 2017), and in other
contexts that it contributes motivational salience that can distinguish close options from
one another more clearly (Manohar & Husain, 2016; Pujara, Philippi, Motzkin, Baskaya,
& Koenigs, 2016; Vaidya & Fellows, 2015b).
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Another broad set of possibilities can be generated by considering the nature of
the random mixture model that individuals with VMF damage satisfy. In this model,
choosers are allowed to have different preference orderings in different contexts or at
different points in time. It is possible, therefore, that VMF somehow contributes to the
same preference ordering being repeated reliably. For example, individuals might use
episodic memories of their previous choices (e.g., “I remember choosing A over B
before”) to guide their decisions. Although we tried to reduce the influence of such
memories, it is difficult to eliminate their influence entirely (Birnbaum, 2011) and VMF
has been implicated in episodic memory processes (Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, &
Ciaramelli, 2016). Alternatively, VMF could support a representation of the context of
the experiment that in turn activates a specific set of preferences, such as in a schematic
network. Consistent with this idea, previous work has shown VMF involvement in
schema formation (Schlichting & Preston, 2016; Spalding et al., 2018).
Finally, we extended previous studies that considered only deterministic notions
of transitivity by identifying heterogeneity in these effects both across individuals and
across domains. There was considerable heterogeneity within the VMF group, where
some participants made as few intransitive choices as healthy controls, while other
participants made significantly more intransitive choices. We did not find any systematic
differences in lesion location or size that accounted for this heterogeneity. The lesions of
the three individuals in the VMF group who made significantly more intransitive choices
overall did not overlap much in their location, and the overlap areas were in the same
location where other individuals had sustained lesions. The lesions of the three most
inconsistent individuals in the VMF group did tend to extend more posteriorly towards
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the basal forebrain and ventral striatum, though given the sample size in our study this
potential explanation will need to be rigorously evaluated in future work with a larger
number of subjects. Future studies could also test alternative explanations that we were
unable to assess by using more advanced imaging to test whether damage to specific
white matter tracts or disruptions in specific connectivity networks are linked to making
more intransitive choices.
There was also considerable heterogeneity across domains, with the pattern of
intransitive choices being most consistent with previous studies (i.e., showing a deficit
selective to VMF damage) in the one the domain, art, that had been used in those studies.
The greatest heterogeneity across domains, though, was in the frontal control group. This
group looked similar to healthy controls in the art domain but made the most number of
intransitive choices in the gamble domain. The frontal control group includes individuals
with damage to the dorsomedial or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and both of these
regions have been previously shown to be involved in decisions about risk
(Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009; Hsu, Krajbich, Zhao, &
Camerer, 2009). Previous studies have started to consider how the brain regions
necessary for preference consistency may vary across domains (Fellows & Farah, 2007;
Henri-Bhargava et al., 2012), and our results further highlight the need to examine a
variety of domains in future work.
In conclusion, we found that individuals with VMF damage make choices that are
noisier, but still fundamentally transitive. This result both characterizes how erratic
choices manifest after damage to the VMF (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Harlow, 1868), as
well as potentially explains why studies using similar decision-making paradigms in
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individuals with VMF-damage can yield different results (Fellows, 2011). In addition,
our findings further clarify and define the necessary role the VMF plays in value-based
decision-making. Specifically, though each choice still reflects some subjective
preference ordering after VMF damage, an intact VMF is necessary for preference
orderings to remain stable and reliable across time and contexts.
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Chapter 5 – General Discussion
Whether you are swiping between potential mates on a dating app, rating a pair of
winter boots you just bought, or putting a bid on a house, there are many factors in your
valuation of those options. However, we seem to be able to, most of the time,
successfully and quickly resolve these factors into a preference. This dissertation sought
to explore how the brain arrives at preferences across several different types of tasks. In
Chapter 2, we assessed a model of decision-making that posited that choosing between
options is akin to navigating a mental space made of option attributes. We found that this
model did not have support in neural responses to a standard choice task, and that
subjective value instead remains a better explanation for the data. In Chapter 3, we
looked for the neural correlates of valuation in a different type of preference task, the
matching task, which featured a longer response period. We found that the valuation
network in the brain responded in much the same way as in choice tasks, and late into the
response period. In Chapter 4, we tested whether the vmPFC is necessary for valuation by
using a probabilistic model of transitivity. We found that vmPFC damage increased noise
in the consistency of preferences, but did not make preferences fundamentally
intransitive. This result shows that though vmPFC is critical for a component of
valuation, multiple neural regions are likely needed to contribute to the valuation process.
This dissertation affirms subjective value as a model of neural representation in
vmPFC during decision-making, that it is robust to the type of preference elicitation and
represents value late into the decision process, and it is likely part of a distributed
network of regions necessary for value construction. These studies confirm some preexisting theories and challenges others. It supports the prevalent subjective value theory
91

of vmPFC function (Kable & Glimcher, 2009), but it limits the role of the vmPFC to
being necessary for an aspect of value, rather than valuation as a whole. This dissertation
is also the first to assess, and challenge, a conceptual navigation account of decisionmaking (Behrens et al., 2018; Bellmund et al., 2018).
Open Questions
This dissertation raises two important questions. In the following section, I will
discuss these questions, and some future directions that could address them. The first
question is, what role does vmPFC play in subjective value? Chapter 4 showed it is
necessary for some aspect of value that reduces noise in valuation – so what could those
aspects be? Relatedly, what models could account for the representations of value at the
end of consideration period? The second question is, what role does the vmPFC play in
other cognitive tasks that could relate to its role in decision-making? For instance, can
our studies that support a view of vmPFC’s involvement in subjective value in decisionmaking, be reconciled with the studies that show that it is involved in spatial or
conceptual navigation (Constantinescu et al., 2016; Doeller et al., 2010)? These two
questions are intertwined, and feed into the main question of what does the vmPFC do?
First, what is the role of the vmPFC in valuation? The results of Chapter 4 support
a view of value as a distributed network. Hunt and Hayden (2017) posit that multiple
regions of the prefrontal cortex compute similar variables (e.g., the attributes of the
options) simultaneously, and feedback into each other in a recurrent, hierarchical
network. Each region of the prefrontal network (such as anterior cingulate cortex,
orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsolateral cortex) computes similar calculations, but receive
92

unique inputs to contribute to the overall representation (for example, the OFC receives
sensory inputs, while the vmPFC receives limbic inputs, etc.). Thus, no one region
conducts one part of the valuation process; rather, all regions do so simultaneously. This
theory is supported by single cell literature showing that virtually all regions of the
frontal cortex compute similar decision variables (Hosokawa, Kennerley, Sloan, &
Wallis, 2013; Hunt, Behrens, Hosokawa, Wallis, & Kennerley, 2015), and the dense
reciprocal interconnections within regions of the frontal cortex (Felleman & Van Essen,
1991; Jbabdi, Sotiropoulos, Haber, Van Essen, & Behrens, 2015). Another prevalent
distributed model of decision-making, the affordance competition hypothesis (Cisek,
2007), posits that goals and action plans for multiple options are prepared simultaneously
and compete against each other. In this framework, competition between different action
plans take place across the frontal-parietal dorsal regions, which is influenced by biasing
factors from prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia. Both of these theories provide
mechanisms by which the valuation representations are presented later into the decision
(e.g., mutual inhibition between options, or competition between action plans) (Hunt et
al., 2012; Jocham et al., 2012; Pastor-Bernier & Cisek, 2011). However, neither of them
address scenarios where valuation is required, but there are no competing options, as in
matching or rating tasks. Though there is a cognitive model from decision field theory
which addresses matching tasks (Johnson & Busemeyer, 2005), there are to date no
neural evidence or mechanisms proposed for this process. This is a gap in the literature
that should be addressed.
Secondly, can vmPFC’s role in subjective value be reconciled with its role in nonvalue-based cognitive domains, from memory, emotional and social cognition, and
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valuation (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012)? One possibility is that different neural
populations of vmPFC subserve these different functions, beyond the resolution that
fMRI can provide. Conversely, however, there could be a broad functionality underlying
these different domains. vmPFC and OFC is thought to represent the underlying structure
of the task (Stalnaker, Cooch, & Schoenbaum, 2015; Wilson et al., 2014). For example,
vmPFC could represent subjective value in decision-making tasks because subjective
value is the most efficient and useful representation for preference tasks, and it could
represent grid-like coding in navigation tasks because that form is the most efficient for
representing a two-dimensional space for that purpose (Behrens et al., 2018). The reason
knowing underlying task structure is useful is because when you are able to represent
different states of the world (beyond just simple response-outcome associations), you can
simulate future events and make predictions. Hippocampus, an area involved in
prospective thinking, projects to the vmPFC, and lesions of the vmPFC causes deficits in
both prospective memory and planning (Bertossi et al., 2016; Fellows & Farah, 2005; S.
L. Peters, Fellows, & Sheldon, 2017). Additionally, both fMRI and lesion evidence have
shown that vmPFC is involved in inferring unseen associations between objects, and for
representing the underlying context of a task, and likely works with the hippocampus to
do so (Zeithamova et al., 2012; Schuck et al., 2016; Spalding et al., 2018). However,
though there have been computational models proposed of how these hidden attributes
can be computed, as well as a role for vmPFC in this function (Gershman, 2018;
Momennejad, Otto, Daw, & Norman, 2017), much work still needs to be done to uncover
the processes behind them. I will discuss some of the potential future avenues of research
now.
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Future Directions
As Chapter 4 suggests that vmPFC is critical for some aspect of valuation, one
main avenue of research would be to figure out precisely those aspects are. The
perspective in Hunt and Hayden (2017) suggests that vmPFC would contribute
components related to its limbic connections (e.g., memory or emotional aspects) to an
overall value representation. There has been some work done that show that individuals
with VMF damage use emotional or social information less in preference judgments of
art and politicians (Vaidya et al., 2017; Xia, Stolle, Gidengil, & Fellows, 2015). These
studies hint at the vmPFC contributing an emotional or contextual component to
valuation, which could be further investigated with more systematic examination of the
components of options. For instance, in studies of consumer products, art, or social
stimuli, it would be a good idea to have the participants rate these items on various
attributes of those items, and then subsequently ask about their preferences among those
items (preferably in a way so that transitivity can be assessed, to check for
inconsistencies). Having both the attribute rating and the subsequent preference
assessment is important because it would show whether the differences in the VMF group
come from a deficit in assessing certain attributes, or if they come from the failure to take
attributes into account during preference assessments.
Secondly, another major research direction would be to test theories of vmPFC
function that can account for its role in both value and non-value based tasks. More work
should be done on both the nature of the vmPFC’s involvement in tasks that require
structure learning, as well as its necessity in these tasks. Specifically, the vmPFC and
OFC have been shown to be critical in devaluation, as well as being involved in
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revaluation tasks in humans (Momennejad et al., 2017; Reber et al., 2017). These tasks
require the participant to learn about direct associations between conditioned stimuli and
reinforcers (e.g., different types of food, or monetary outcomes), learning that the
reinforcer’s value change in some way separately from conditioned stimulus (either
devalued through satiation, or changed in monetary amounts), and then querying the
value of the conditioned stimuli to see if those have changed along with the values of
their associated reinforcers. Neural evidence has suggested that offline replay, that is,
hippocampal activity during rest periods in the middle of the task, supported later
revaluation (Momennejad et al., 2017). Thus, it would be useful to look at the functional
connectivity between hippocampus and vmPFC/OFC regions during periods of structure
learning. Additionally, the OFC has been shown to encode the changes in the latent state
of a task with probabilistic outcomes (Nassar, McGuire, Ritz, & Kable, 2018). This type
of task is analogous to our anthropoid ancestors learning about the weather shifts which
determine the probabilistic flowering of individual fruit trees. Successful performance is
predicated on determining the true source of the outcomes, and when this source changes.
Future directions for this research include finding out whether this latent state
representation includes recognition of previously learnt states when the environment
returns to them, as well as whether the OFC is necessary for this type of learning in lesion
experiments.
Finally, as alluded to above, very little work has been done on modelling the
mechanisms by which valuation occurs in the absence of competition between options, as
in matching or rating tasks. One obvious direction is to find neural correlates for the
decision field theory model proposed by Johnson and Busemeyer (2005), which posits
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that sampled values are adjusted up or down until an indifference decision threshold is
crossed. Similar accumulation-to-bound models for choice tasks (e.g., the drift diffusion
model) has support in the firing in areas like the lateral intraparietal area in primates
(Shadlen & Newsome, 1996), which may be a candidate for this modified choice model.
In summary, this dissertation refines our understanding of the vmPFC’s role
during decision-making. It shows that subjective value remains the best explanation of its
role in determining preferences, whether for choice or for matching tasks, but also limits
it to a role later in the decision-process. It furthermore clarifies that the vmPFC is
necessary for a component of the valuation process that maintains the stability of
preferences, but a lesion of the vmPFC does not abolish valuation. This work points to
ways that our understanding of the vmPFC can be further advanced, not just for decisionmaking, but for its role in cognition more broadly as well.

97

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baron, J. (2008). Thinking and deciding 4th ed: New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bartra, O., McGuire, J. T., & Kable, J. W. (2013). The valuation system: a coordinatebased meta-analysis of BOLD fMRI experiments examining neural correlates of
subjective value. NeuroImage, 76, 412-427.
Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a
single-response sequential method. Behavioral Science, 9(3), 226-232.
Behrens, T. E., Muller, T. H., Whittington, J. C., Mark, S., Baram, A. B., Stachenfeld, K.
L., & Kurth-Nelson, Z. (2018). What Is a Cognitive Map? Organizing Knowledge
for Flexible Behavior. Neuron, 100(2), 490-509.
Bellmund, J. L., Gärdenfors, P., Moser, E. I., & Doeller, C. F. (2018). Navigating
cognition: Spatial codes for human thinking. Science, 362(6415), eaat6766.
Bertossi, E., Tesini, C., Cappelli, A., & Ciaramelli, E. (2016). Ventromedial prefrontal
damage causes a pervasive impairment of episodic memory and future thinking.
Neuropsychologia. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.01.034
Birnbaum, M. H. (2011). Testing mixture models of transitive preference: Comment on
Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (2011).
Camille, N., Griffiths, C. A., Vo, K., Fellows, L. K., & Kable, J. W. (2011).
Ventromedial frontal lobe damage disrupts value maximization in humans. The
Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience,
31(20), 7527-7532. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6527-10.2011

98

Chib, V. S., Rangel, A., Shimojo, S., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2009). Evidence for a common
representation of decision values for dissimilar goods in human ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 29(39), 12315-12320.
Christopoulos, G. I., Tobler, P. N., Bossaerts, P., Dolan, R. J., & Schultz, W. (2009).
Neural correlates of value, risk, and risk aversion contributing to decision making
under risk. Journal of Neuroscience, 29(40), 12574-12583.
Cisek, P. (2007). Cortical mechanisms of action selection: the affordance competition
hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B:
Biological Sciences, 362(1485), 1585-1599.
Clithero, J. A., & Rangel, A. (2013). Informatic parcellation of the network involved in
the computation of subjective value. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience,
9(9), 1289-1302.
Constantinescu, A. O., O’Reilly, J. X., & Behrens, T. E. (2016). Organizing conceptual
knowledge in humans with a gridlike code. Science, 352(6292), 1464-1468.
Cooper, N., Kable, J. W., Kim, B. K., & Zauberman, G. (2013). Brain activity in
valuation regions while thinking about the future predicts individual discount
rates. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(32), 13150-13156.
Crawford, J. R., & Howell, D. C. (1998). Comparing an individual's test score against
norms derived from small samples. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 12(4), 482486.
Devi, V. R., Guttes, E., & Guttes, S. (1968). Effects of ultraviolet light on mitosis in
Physarum polycephalum. Experimental cell research, 50(3), 589-598.

99

Doeller, C. F., Barry, C., & Burgess, N. (2010). Evidence for grid cells in a human
memory network. Nature, 463(7281), 657.
Eslinger, P. J., & Damasio, A. R. (1985). Severe disturbance of higher cognition after
bilateral frontal lobe ablation. Patient EVR, 35(12), 1731-1731.
doi:10.1212/wnl.35.12.1731
Felleman, D. J., & Van Essen, D. C. (1991). Distributed hierarchical processing in the
primate cerebral cortex. Cerebral cortex (New York, NY: 1991), 1(1), 1-47.
Fellows, L. K. (2011). 16 The Neurology of Value. Neurobiology of sensation and
reward, 351.
Fellows, L. K., & Farah, M. J. (2005). Dissociable elements of human foresight: a role
for the ventromedial frontal lobes in framing the future, but not in discounting
future rewards. Neuropsychologia, 43(8), 12141221.
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.07.018
Fellows, L. K., & Farah, M. J. (2007). The role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex in
decision making: judgment under uncertainty or judgment per se? Cerebral cortex
(New York, N.Y. : 1991), 17(11), 2669-2674. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhl176
Fellows, L. K., Stark, M., Berg, A., & Chatterjee, A. (2008). Patient registries in
cognitive neuroscience research: Advantages, challenges, and practical advice.
Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 20(6), 1107-1113.
Fischer, G. W., & Hawkins, S. A. (1993). Strategy compatibility, scale compatibility, and
the prominence effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance, 19(3), 580.

100

Gershman, S. J. (2018). The successor representation: Its computational logic and neural
substrates. Journal of Neuroscience, 38(33), 7193-7200.
Haber, S. N. (2016). Corticostriatal circuitry. Neuroscience in the 21st Century, 1-21.
Hafting, T., Fyhn, M., Molden, S., Moser, M.-B., & Moser, E. I. (2005). Microstructure
of a spatial map in the entorhinal cortex. Nature, 436(7052), 801-806.
Hare, T. A., Camerer, C. F., & Rangel, A. (2009). Self-control in decision-making
involves modulation of the vmPFC valuation system. Science, 324(5927), 646648.
Hare, T. A., O'Doherty, J., Camerer, C. F., Schultz, W., & Rangel, A. (2008).
Dissociating the role of the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum in the
computation of goal values and prediction errors. Journal of Neuroscience,
28(22), 5623-5630.
Harlow, J. M. (1868). Recovery from the passage of an iron bar through the head.
Publications of the Massachusetts Medical Society, 2(3), 274-281.
Harris, A., Adolphs, R., Camerer, C., & Rangel, A. (2011). Dynamic construction of
stimulus values in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. PLoS ONE, 6(6), e21074.
Harris, A., Clithero, J. A., & Hutcherson, C. A. (2018). Accounting for taste: A multiattribute neurocomputational model explains the neural dynamics of choices for
self and others. Journal of Neuroscience, 38(37), 7952-7968.
Henri-Bhargava, A., Simioni, A., & Fellows, L. K. (2012). Ventromedial frontal lobe
damage disrupts the accuracy, but not the speed, of value-based preference
judgments. Neuropsychologia, 50(7), 1536-1542.
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.03.006
101

Hosokawa, T., Kennerley, S. W., Sloan, J., & Wallis, J. D. (2013). Single-neuron
mechanisms underlying cost-benefit analysis in frontal cortex. The Journal of
Neuroscience, 33(44), 17385-17397.
Howard, J. D., Gottfried, J. A., Tobler, P. N., & Kahnt, T. (2015). Identity-specific
coding of future rewards in the human orbitofrontal cortex. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 112(16), 5195-5200.
Howard, J. D., & Kahnt, T. (2017). Identity-specific reward representations in
orbitofrontal cortex are modulated by selective devaluation. Journal of
Neuroscience, 3473-3416.
Hsu, M., Krajbich, I., Zhao, C., & Camerer, C. F. (2009). Neural response to reward
anticipation under risk is nonlinear in probabilities. Journal of Neuroscience,
29(7), 2231-2237.
Hunt, L. T., Behrens, T. E., Hosokawa, T., Wallis, J. D., & Kennerley, S. W. (2015).
Capturing the temporal evolution of choice across prefrontal cortex. eLife, 4,
e11945.
Hunt, L. T., & Hayden, B. Y. (2017). A distributed, hierarchical and recurrent framework
for reward-based choice. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 18(3), 172.
Hunt, L. T., Kolling, N., Soltani, A., Woolrich, M. W., Rushworth, M. F., & Behrens, T.
E. (2012). Mechanisms underlying cortical activity during value-guided choice.
Nature Neuroscience, 15(3), 470.
Hunt, L. T., Woolrich, M. W., Rushworth, M. F., & Behrens, T. E. (2013). Trial-type
dependent frames of reference for value comparison. PLoS computational
biology, 9(9), e1003225.
102

Jacobs, J., Weidemann, C. T., Miller, J. F., Solway, A., Burke, J. F., Wei, X.-X., . . .
Fried, I. (2013). Direct recordings of grid-like neuronal activity in human spatial
navigation. Nature Neuroscience, 16(9), 1188-1190.
Jbabdi, S., Sotiropoulos, S. N., Haber, S. N., Van Essen, D. C., & Behrens, T. E. (2015).
Measuring macroscopic brain connections in vivo. Nature Neuroscience, 18(11),
1546.
Jenkinson, M., Beckmann, C. F., Behrens, T. E., Woolrich, M. W., & Smith, S. M.
(2012). Fsl. NeuroImage, 62(2), 782-790.
Jocham, G., Hunt, L. T., Near, J., & Behrens, T. E. (2012). A mechanism for valueguided choice based on the excitation-inhibition balance in prefrontal cortex.
Nature Neuroscience, 15(7), 960.
Johnson, J. G., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2005). A dynamic, stochastic, computational model
of preference reversal phenomena. Psychological Review, 112(4), 841.
Kable, J. W., Caulfield, M. K., Falcone, M., McConnell, M., Bernardo, L., Parthasarathi,
T., . . . Lerman, C. (2017). No effect of commercial cognitive training on brain
activity, choice behavior, or cognitive performance. Journal of Neuroscience,
37(31), 7390-7402.
Kable, J. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2007). The neural correlates of subjective value during
intertemporal choice. Nature Neuroscience, 10(12), 1625-1633.
doi:10.1038/nn2007
Kable, J. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2009). The neurobiology of decision: consensus and
controversy. Neuron, 63(6), 733-745.

103

Knutson, B., Rick, S., Wimmer, G. E., Prelec, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2007). Neural
predictors of purchases. Neuron, 53(1), 147-156.
Latty, T., & Beekman, M. (2010). Food quality and the risk of light exposure affect
patch-choice decisions in the slime mold Physarum polycephalum. Ecology,
91(1), 22-27.
Levy, D. J., & Glimcher, P. W. (2012). The root of all value: a neural common currency
for choice. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 22(6), 1027-1038.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2012.06.001
Luce, R. (1959). Individual Choice Behaviour. A Theorical Analysis: New York. Willey.
Manohar, S. G., & Husain, M. (2016). Human ventromedial prefrontal lesions alter
incentivisation by reward. Cortex: A Journal Devoted to the Study of the Nervous
System and Behavior, 76, 104-120.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2016.01.005
McFadden, D. (1980). Econometric Models for Probabilistic Choice Among Products.
The Journal of Business, 53(3), S13-S29.
McGuire, J. T., & Kable, J. W. (2015). Medial prefrontal cortical activity reflects
dynamic re-evaluation during voluntary persistence. Nature Neuroscience, 18(5),
760.
Mellers, B. A., Ordoñez, L. D., & Birnbaum, M. H. (1992). A change-of-process theory
for contextual effects and preference reversals in risky decision making.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 52(3), 331-369.
Momennejad, I., Otto, A. R., Daw, N. D., & Norman, K. A. (2017). Offline Replay
Supports Planning: fMRI Evidence from Reward Revaluation. bioRxiv, 196758.
104

Nassar, M. R., McGuire, J. T., Ritz, H., & Kable, J. (2018). Dissociable forms of
uncertainty-driven representational change across the human brain. bioRxiv,
364638.
Öngür, D., & Price, J. L. (2000). The Organization of Networks within the Orbital and
Medial Prefrontal Cortex of Rats, Monkeys and Humans. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3),
206-219. doi:10.1093/cercor/10.3.206
Padoa-Schioppa, C., & Assad, J. A. (2006). Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode
economic value. Nature, 441(7090), 223-226.
Pastor-Bernier, A., & Cisek, P. (2011). Neural correlates of biased competition in
premotor cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(19), 7083-7088.
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1992). Behavioral decision research: A
constructive processing perspective. Annual review of psychology, 43(1), 87-131.
Pegors, T. K., Kable, J. W., Chatterjee, A., & Epstein, R. A. (2015). Common and unique
representations in pFC for face and place attractiveness. Journal of cognitive
neuroscience.
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2010). Neural representations of subjective reward value.
Behavioural brain research, 213(2), 135-141.
Peters, S. L., Fellows, L. K., & Sheldon, S. (2017). The ventromedial frontal lobe
contributes to forming effective solutions to real-world problems. Journal of
cognitive neuroscience, 29(6), 991-1001.
Petrides, M., & Pandya, D. (1994). Comparative architectonic analysis of the human and
the macaque frontal cortex. In F. Boller & J. Grafman (Eds.), Handbook of
neuropsychology (Vol. 9). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
105

Plassmann, H., O'Doherty, J., & Rangel, A. (2007). Orbitofrontal cortex encodes
willingness to pay in everyday economic transactions. Journal of Neuroscience,
27(37), 9984-9988.
Pujara, M. S., Philippi, C. L., Motzkin, J. C., Baskaya, M. K., & Koenigs, M. (2016).
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage is associated with decreased ventral
striatum volume and response to reward. Journal of Neuroscience, 36(18), 50475054.
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85(2), 59.
Reber, J., Feinstein, J. S., O’doherty, J. P., Liljeholm, M., Adolphs, R., & Tranel, D.
(2017). Selective impairment of goal-directed decision-making following lesions
to the human ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Brain, 140(6), 1743-1756.
Regenwetter, M., Dana, J., & Davis-Stober, C. P. (2010). Testing transitivity of
preferences on two-alternative forced choice data. Frontiers in psychology, 1,
148.
Regenwetter, M., Dana, J., & Davis-Stober, C. P. (2011). Transitivity of preferences.
Psychological Review, 118(1), 42-56. doi:10.1037/a0021150
Regenwetter, M., Davis-Stober, C. P., Lim, S. H., Guo, Y., Popova, A., Zwilling, C., . . .
Messner, W. (2014). QTest: Quantitative testing of theories of binary choice.
Decision, 1(1), 2.
Roy, M., Shohamy, D., & Wager, T. D. (2012). Ventromedial prefrontal-subcortical
systems and the generation of affective meaning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
16(3), 147-156.

106

Samuelson, P. A. (1937). A note on measurement of utility. The review of economic
studies, 4(2), 155-161.
Schlichting, M. L., & Preston, A. R. (2016). Hippocampal–medial prefrontal circuit
supports memory updating during learning and post-encoding rest. Neurobiology
of Learning and Memory, 134, 91-106.
Schuck, N. W., Cai, M. B., Wilson, R. C., & Niv, Y. (2016). Human orbitofrontal cortex
represents a cognitive map of state space. Neuron, 91(6), 1402-1412.
Shadlen, M. N., & Newsome, W. T. (1996). Motion perception: seeing and deciding.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 93(2), 628-633.
Smith, S. M., & Nichols, T. E. (2009). Threshold-free cluster enhancement: addressing
problems of smoothing, threshold dependence and localisation in cluster
inference. NeuroImage, 44(1), 83-98.
Spalding, K. N., Jones, S. H., Duff, M. C., Tranel, D., & Warren, D. E. (2015).
Investigating the Neural Correlates of Schemas: Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex
Is Necessary for Normal Schematic Influence on Memory. The Journal of
neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 35(47), 1574615751. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2767-15.2015
Spalding, K. N., Schlichting, M. L., Zeithamova, D., Preston, A. R., Tranel, D., Duff, M.
C., & Warren, D. E. (2018). Ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary for
normal associative inference and memory integration. Journal of Neuroscience,
38(15), 3767-3775.
Stalnaker, T. A., Cooch, N. K., & Schoenbaum, G. (2015). What the orbitofrontal cortex
does not do. Nature Neuroscience, 18(5), 620.
107

Strait, C. E., Blanchard, T. C., & Hayden, B. Y. (2014). Reward Value Comparison via
Mutual Inhibition in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex. Neuron, 82(6), 13571366.
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.04.032
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55(4), 189.
Tom, S. M., Fox, C. R., Trepel, C., & Poldrack, R. A. (2007). The neural basis of loss
aversion in decision-making under risk. Science, 315(5811), 515-518.
Tversky, A. (1969). Intransitivity of preferences. Psychological Review.
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent weighting in judgment and
choice. Psychological Review, 95(3), 371.
Vaidya, A. R., & Fellows, L. K. (2015a). Testing necessary regional frontal contributions
to value assessment and fixation-based updating. Nature communications, 6,
10120. doi:10.1038/ncomms10120
Vaidya, A. R., & Fellows, L. K. (2015b). Ventromedial frontal cortex is critical for
guiding attention to reward-predictive visual features in humans. The Journal of
Neuroscience, 35(37), 12813-12823.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1607-15.2015
Vaidya, A. R., Sefranek, M., & Fellows, L. K. (2017). Ventromedial Frontal Lobe
Damage Alters how Specific Attributes are Weighed in Subjective Valuation.
Cerebral Cortex, 1-11.
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1945). Theory of games and economic behavior:
Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ.
Wilson, R. C., Takahashi, Y. K., Schoenbaum, G., & Niv, Y. (2014). Orbitofrontal cortex
as a cognitive map of task space. Neuron, 81(2), 267-279.
108

Xia, C., Stolle, D., Gidengil, E., & Fellows, L. K. (2015). Lateral orbitofrontal cortex
links social impressions to political choices. The Journal of Neuroscience, 35(22),
8507-8514. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0526-15.2015
Yamada, H., Louie, K., Tymula, A., & Glimcher, P. W. (2018). Free choice shapes
normalized value signals in medial orbitofrontal cortex. Nature communications,
9(1), 162.
Zauberman, G., Kim, B. K., Malkoc, S. A., & Bettman, J. R. (2009). Discounting time
and time discounting: Subjective time perception and intertemporal preferences.
Journal of Marketing Research, 46(4), 543-556.
Zeithamova, D., Dominick, A. L., & Preston, A. R. (2012). Hippocampal and ventral
medial prefrontal activation during retrieval-mediated learning supports novel
inference. Neuron, 75(1), 168-179.

109

